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Abstract
The purpose of this research is to study the financial contagion of the bank-
ing system in the presence of an interbank market and how do the reserve and
capital adequacy requirements play a role in enhancing the stability of the system.
I develop an interbank market model that exhibits a tiering structure and
study how the network characteristics and the regulatory requirements play a
role on the systemic risk in the banking system. The basic model is based on
Iori, Jafarey, and Padilla (2006). I advance the model in a number of aspects.
Firstly, I examine an interbank market with a core-peripheral, which is found in
real-world interbank markets. Secondly, I introduce a parameter that determines
the difference in the size of deposit and investment opportunity in a bank, and
I also limit the fluctuation in customers’ deposit for small banks. In doing so, I
create a banking system that shows more resemblance to the real-world market
in which large banks are deposit-taking banks while small banks have proportion-
ately more investment opportunity and that large banks are interbank borrowers
while small banks are interbank lenders. Thirdly, I study the stability of the
banking system with respect to both the reserve requirement and the capital ad-
equacy requirement.
I show that the effects of the two regulatory requirements have on the sta-
bility of the system are closely related to how they affect the interbank activity.
By tightening the reserve requirements, banks are forced to retain a bigger por-
tion of deposit as liquid reserves. This act as a better insurance for individual
banks against liquidity shocks. However, this action also results in a reducing
the amount of surplus liquidity a potential interbank lenders has, and to some
extent, it restricts these banks to transact in the interbank market completely.
Therefore, this put those banks which have big fluctuation in customers’ deposit
in great risk because they do not have any counterparties to transact with in the
interbank market when they face a liquidity shortage. Similarly, the tightening of
the capital adequacy requirement also restrict interbank activity, which in turns
ii
affects the chances of banks arranging interbank borrowings when they have a
liquidity need.
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Abbreviations
N Number of simulations
C Connectivity
T Number of periods
M Number of banks in the system
τ The maturity of the investment
κ Imbalance parameter
δ Aggregate investment opportunity : aggregate bank size ratio
S¯ Size of a large bank
σS Fluctuation in bank size across small banks
σD Fluctuation in deposit over time
σω Fluctuation in investment over time
rD Interest rate for deposits
rB Interest rate for interbank transaction
rI Income rate for investment
β Reserve requirement ratio
χ Equity requirement ratio
φ Capital adequacy requirement ratio
αL Parameter for autoregressive process in deposit for large bank
αS Parameter for autoregressive process in deposit for small banks
γ Parameter in the risky asset function
ρI The weighted-risk of investment
ρIL The weighted-risk of interbank lending
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis explores the potential and severity of contagious default in the inter-
bank market through a theoretical perspective. I develop an artificial interbank
market model that mimics the features in the real-world interbank market and
simulate the daily operation of banks in such a system. By introducing a chan-
nel in which banks face liquidity shortage, I study the interaction between the
benefits of using of interbank market and the risk these banks are exposed to.
The main objective of the research is two-fold. Firstly, it aims to understand
some of the determinants that affects the stability of the banking system, in the
presence of the interbank market. Secondly, it studies the interaction between
these determinants and the regulatory requirements and how they contribute to
the efficiency of the market and the potential contagion in the system. This
chapter presents the motivation of this research, the related research background
in this area, a number of research questions together with the outline of the thesis.
1.1 Background and motivation
Financial crises have always been the strongest witness to testify how susceptible
the financial system can be. Although these financial crises happen rarely, when
they do, they often bring a catastrophic damage to the system. Therefore, it is of
interest and great importance to gain an in-depth and thorough understanding
of the type of risks the system is exposed to and of any precaution measures that
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can be taken into consideration to prevent these risks turning into financial crises.
Back in 2007 and 2008, the banking systems in the UK and U.S. experienced one
of the biggest crises, which nearly brought the financial systems all down. The
incident does raise the alarm again about the presence of systemic risks in the
banking system and that they are capable of bringing a complete shut-down to
the system.
In the literature, researchers have identified various possible channels of con-
tagion that can be found in the banking system. On one hand, some of these
affect the liability side of banks including banks runs arising from the fear of
withdrawals from other depositors, see Diamond and Dybvig (1983), or a com-
mon pool of liquidity, see Aghion, Bolton, and Dewatripont (2000) and Diamond
and Rajan (2005), or information contagion, see Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008).
On the other hand, some of these channels of contagion have an impact on the as-
set side of banks and they include the payment system, as studied by Humphrey
(1986) and Angelini, Maresca, and Russo (1996), or FX settlement, see Blavarg
and Nimander (2002) or the interbank market, see Rochet and Tirole (1996). In
the past decade, research on the study of the interbank lending market as the
channel of contagion has growth extensively. This is because it is believed that a
bank that transacts in the interbank market is not only exposed to counterparty
risk with the other banks that it trades with, but it is also exposed to a knock-on
effect through these inter-related interbank linkages.
The presence of an interbank market permits banks to exchange liquidity with
others for insurance purpose; it also allows illiquid banks to have access to liquid-
ity. In other words, an interbank market fulfils the purpose of re-distribution of
liquidity among the banking system, see Allen and Gale (2000). Unfortunately,
these cross holdings of interbank transactions also give rise to a channel of conta-
gion. It has been argued that the interbank market is not only a ‘shock-absorber’,
in the case where deficit banks use the market to take care of their liquidity issues,
but it also acts as a ‘shock-transmitter’ when the problem in one bank is spread to
the others through interbank linkages, see Nier, Yang, Yorulmazer, and Alentorn
(2008). A number of questions emerge from the above argument. Do the benefits
2
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of using the interbank market outweigh the cost of the potential damage it can
bring to the banking system? Under what conditions does the interbank market
act as a ‘shock-absorber’? Are there any ways to prevent the contagious default
to take place via these interbank linkages while banks are still able to make good
use of it? These lead researchers to examine the interbank market carefully.
The famous work by Allen and Gale (2000) shed light on the study of the sys-
temic risk in the interbank market. They show that one can use network topology
to represent the network structure of an interbank market and point out that the
exact structure of such a market plays an important role. Since then, there have
been a lot of empirical studies that investigate the exact network structure of a
real-world interbank market in a particular country and/or examine the potential
and severity of contagion in the market, see Blavarg and Nimander (2002), van
Lelyveld and Liedorp (2006), Toivanen (2009) and many others. Upper (2011)
provides a comprehensive summary and comparison of these empirical studies up
to 2011. However, these empirical works have their own drawbacks. Firstly, each
of them are only able to study a specific country and hence their findings and
conclusions are not generalisable. Secondly, a majority of them do not actually
have access to the complete bilateral interbank exposures between banks and
therefore they suffer from data limitation. Thirdly, due to the data limitation
problem, most of these studies choose to use the entropy maximisation (see Fang,
Rajasekera, and Tsao (1997)) to estimate the bilateral interbank exposures from
the aggregate exposures. Mistrulli (2011) test this methodology with a set of
complete and observed bilateral exposures against the estimated bilateral expo-
sures. The author shows that the method introduces bias into the analysis and it
is likely to underestimate the potential and severity of contagion because it relies
on the assumption that the interbank activity is spread evenly across the system,
which is not the case in reality. Fourthly, these papers are unable to inform us
how particular feature makes the banking system more prone to contagion.
In view of the drawbacks in these empirical studies, there is another strand
of literature which studies the interbank market. It tackles the issue from a the-
oretical perspective and fills up some of the gaps that empirical studies are not
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able to offer. These theoretical papers attempt to understand different aspects of
the interbank market through simulations in an artificial model of the interbank
market. Iori, Jafarey, and Padilla (2006) run a dynamic model of an interbank
market with a random network structure. They simulate a system of banks which
face a fluctuation in deposit patterns and create the need of interbank borrowing.
They mainly focus on the number of defaults in different scenarios and show that
an increase in connectivity improves the stability of the system while an increase
in heterogeneity in the system can make the system more unstable. Nier, Yang,
Yorulmazer, and Alentorn (2008) build a static model of the interbank market
with a random network structure. They assume interbank holdings across banks
and introduce an idiosyncratic shock that randomly wipe out a bank’s capital.
They study the effect of a number of determinants in the banking system in-
cluding connectivity, concentration, capital ratio. They extend the model by
incorporating liquidity risk and also briefly look at the tiering structure. The
model by Gai and Kapadia (2010) shares a lot of similarities with Nier, Yang,
Yorulmazer, and Alentorn (2008), but the authors consider also an aggregate
shock which reduces the capital holdings of banks. Both of these papers show a
non-monotonic relationship between connectivity and the stability of the system
and they also emphasise on the importance of banks being capitalised.
Although the two most common network structures found in those empir-
ical studies for real-world interbank market are scale-free structure (see Boss,
Elsinger, Summer, and Thurner (2004a), Cajueiro and Tabak (2008) and many
others) and the tiering structure (see Wells (2002) and Iori, De-Masi, Precup,
Gabbi, and Caldarelli (2008)), Newman, Baraba´si, and Watts (2006) list out the
three most network structures commonly being studied for the interbank market
are the random structure, the small-world structure and the scale-free structure.
From a theoretical perspective, this poses a lot of questions in this line of research.
For example, what are the main factors that determine the stability of an inter-
bank market with a particular network structure? Does one network structure
provide a greater stability to the system than others? Does the vulnerability of
the real-world interbank markets reduce if the banks are connected in a different
manner? Is there a trade-off between stability and efficiency? These motivate
4
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the research to the pursue of a thorough understanding of the interbank market
and whether it exposes the banking system to financial contagion and how does
this relate to the network structure of the market.
Very recently, Ladley (2013) considers an interbank market model and pays
specific attentions on the effect of contagion with respect to regulatory changes.
He studies three different regulatory measures and shows that a higher equity re-
quirement brings a reduction in contagious default while a higher reserve require-
ment does the opposite. He also considers restricting the amount of interbank
transaction and finds that it has two opposite effects, depending on the size of
the shock hitting the system. This paper also motivates the research to take into
account of the role of regulatory requirements in the model.
1.2 Research questions
Research question 1
If the interbank market can act as both ‘shock-absorber’ and ‘shock-transmitter’
as suggested in the literature, then can its benefits outweigh its complication?
What is the trade-off in the presence of an interbank market?
Research question 2
Is it possible to achieve an optimal environment for banks to use the interbank
market which gives a minimal chance of contagion?
Research question 3
Is tightening regulatory requirement the ultimate solution to the prevention of
contagious default in the interbank market? What are the drawbacks?
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1.3 Overview of the thesis
This thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 presents a literature review on the
financial contagion in the interbank market. This includes the channel of conta-
gion in the interbank lending market, the use of network topology in representing
the structure of the market, the empirical studies of the network structure and the
interbank contagion in real-world banking systems and the theoretical analysis of
the systemic risk in some artificial models. Chapter 3 presents the implementa-
tion of Iori, Jafarey, and Padilla (2006) model, which investigate the systemic risk
in the interbank market with a random network structure and in the presence
of heterogeneity in the system. The implementation forms the basic model of
this research. However, there are a number of problems encountered during the
implementation, Therefore, Chapter 4 points out these problems and provides
modifications to the model, together with some preliminary results. Chapter 5
introduces the interbank market model for this research, describing the construc-
tion of the network of an interbank market and the simulation procedure of the
operation of banks. It then presents the simulation results and also provides an
analysis and a discussion of the results. Chapter 6 concludes the research.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
The interbank market is a subset of the financial system and it provides a money-
exchange mechanism for banks. One of the advantages of the interbank market
in the financial system is that it allows the transferral of liquidity across different
banks. Liquidity transferral is particularly important to banks. This is because
there is often a mismatch in the maturity of a bank’s short-term liability and its
long-term assets. An example of short-term liabilities is the cash that customers
deposit in a bank and this deposit can be withdrawn upon customers’ preference
and convenience. One type of long-term assets can be in the form of investment
that a bank makes, for example, loans to non-bank financial intermediaries or
mortgages to individual borrowers. This mismatch in maturity can create liquid-
ity problem for banks. Therefore, banks can use the interbank market to help
manage their liquidity. Allen and Gale (2000) shows that banks can also make
deposits in other banks via the interbank market as a coinsurance purpose.
Failure in managing liquidity well can cause problems, and to certain extent,
it can obstruct a bank from performing its daily operation and result in default.
Therefore, it is critically important for them to manage their liquidity well. Un-
fortunately, the liquidity of these financial intermediaries can fluctuate a lot from
day to day. Therefore, it is essential for them to have access to liquidity from
other means and they can do this through the interbank market. This is because
7
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the interbank market allows both liquidity-surplus and liquidity-deficit financial
intermediaries to come into direct contact with each other. As a result, those
with surplus can lend to those with shortage.
2.2 Network topology
A system can be characterised by the number of its components, the structure
formed by these components and the interconnectedness among them, the be-
haviour and the functionality of the system as a whole. Therefore, in order to
study the stability of a system, it is essential to gain an understanding of the
network of the system, in other words, how the entities within the system are
connected to each other.
Network topology can be used to represent the specific arrangement of entities
within a system. Topology can be interpreted as the shape or the structure of
the system. The elements within the system are represented by nodes and the
connections between them are represented by links. Network topology is com-
monly used in computer networks, see Bird and Harwood (2005), and in biological
networks, see Liao, Boscolo, Yang, Tran, Sabatti, and Roychowdhury (2003) and
Klemm and Bornholdt (2005). However, there is an increase survey of the net-
work topology in understanding financial networks, for example, Thurner, Hanel,
and Pichler (2003) study the efficiency of different topologies with respect to
how different agents perform in the designed risk-trading game; and Soramaki,
Bech, Arnold, Glass, and Beyeler (2007) investigate the various possible network
topologies of the interbank payment flows.
2.2.1 The use of network topology in the study of inter-
bank market
The famous paper by Allen and Gale (2000) was one of the first papers that study
the relationship between the network structure of the banking system and the po-
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tential of financial contagion. They consider three different structures formed by
four entities and study the possibility of financial contagion in the presence of ag-
gregate liquidity shortage. They show that some structures are more susceptible
than others and in particular, they show that the ‘completeness’ of a structure
plays an important role. The examples that they study are very basic and are
difficult to make comparison to the real-world network. On a positive note, this
paper shed light on the usage of network topology in studying systemic risk in
the interbank market and it also shows that the use of interbank lending market
can redistribute liquidity but cannot create liquidity when there is an aggregate
liquidity shortage. Since then, there has been a vast growth in the literature in
the analysis of the network structure of the interbank market in different coun-
tries and how does the structure pose a systemic risk to the system. Allen and
Babus (2009), looking at different networks in the financial systems, suggest that
the network theory together with the incorporation of economic interactions can
help understand many economic phenomena. More specifically, they illustrate
the use of network analysis in interpreting what has happened in the interbank
market in 2008.
Bird and Harwood (2005) describe the most common network topologies found
in computer networks. However, not all of the network topologies are relevant to
this research. Newman, Baraba´si, and Watts (2006) summarise the three network
structures that are either found in real-world market or used in some theoretical
study of systemic risk in the interbank market. The three network structures are:
the random structure, first introduced in Erdo˝s and Re´nyi (1959); the small-world
structure, introduced in Watts and Strogatz (1998); and the scale-free structure,
introduced in Baraba´si and Albert (1999). A random structure, sometimes re-
ferred as the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi model, is formed by introducing a link between any pair
of nodes in the network with a fixed probability p. There has been some advances
in creating a random network from the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi model. Some of the papers
that consider a random network structure include Iori, Jafarey, and Padilla (2006)
and Nier, Yang, Yorulmazer, and Alentorn (2008). Although the random network
structure is simply and very useful in many application, the drawback is that it
does not exhibit some of the important properties and characteristics that one
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can usually find in real-world structure. The second structure is a small-world
structure, also known as the Watts-Strogatz model. The algorithm for forming
a small-world structure is by creating a ring lattice that consists of N nodes.
Let k to be the mean degree of connections per node, then connect each of the
node in the lattice to k of its neighbouring nodes. Next, for each pair of nodes
that has a link, rewire one end of the link to another node in the lattice, chosen
randomly with a probability p. The beauty of small world structure is that, if
p = 1, then it will result in a completely random network structure.’. However,
Mitchell (2006) argues that the small-world network model is not the best match
to most studied real-world networks. At a similar time, Baraba´si and Albert
(1999) designed an alternative network model, so-called the scale-free networks.
A scale-free network, also referred as the Baraba´si-Albert model, is simply one
with a power-law degree distribution. Apart these from three general model,
Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2000) suggest another network structure, in which
there are many institutions at the periphery and they are linked to the bank (or a
small number of banks) at the centre. This structure is sometimes referred as the
core-periphery structure or a star structure. It is later showed in some empiri-
cal research that this structure is found in some real-world interbank markets too.
2.2.2 Network structure of real-world interbank markets
Empirical studies regarding the structure of the interbank lending markets are
not very common. Way before most of the existing empirical studies on interbank
market were carried out, Todd and Thomson (1990) identify that these works are
constrained from data limitation. This is because the interbank exposures are
often only available as aggregate exposures, meaning that the bilateral interbank
exposures between any two specific banks are not differentiated out from the
aggregate. This fact is supported by Furfine (2003), Upper and Worms (2004),
Wells (2002) and many others. There are only a few studies which managed to
obtain the complete set of data on the bilateral interbank exposures for banks
and they include Lubloy (2004) and Mistrulli (2011) analysing the Hungarian
and the Italian interbank market respectively. In the absence of the complete
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set of data on the interbank counter-party loan exposures, researchers who study
the interbank lending markets often have to use some assumptions in estimating
the unknown data for bilateral exposures. Therefore, the results found in these
empirical researches are vastly dependent on the particular system or country
studied and cannot be easily generalised. It is also worth-noting that the estima-
tion method introduces bias to the findings. Despite this shortcoming, this line of
research is still extremely valuable in providing great insights into the empirical
importance of interbank contagion for real-world network.
Most of the empirical studies on the network structure of the interbank
market show that real-world interbank markets are often best represented by
a scale-free network, in which the degree distribution follows a power law. These
include Blavarg and Nimander (2002) for the Sweden interbank market; both
Boss, Elsinger, Summer, and Thurner (2004a) and Boss, Elsinger, Summer, and
Thurner (2004b) for the Austrian interbank market; van Lelyveld and Liedorp
(2006) for the Dutch interbank market; both Cajueiro and Tabak (2008) and
Santos and Cont (2010) for the Brazilian interbank market; Toivanen (2009) for
the Finnish interbank market; Lubloy (2004) for the Hungarian interbank market
and Inaoka, Takayasu, Shimizu, Ninomiya, and Taniguchi (2004) for the Japan
banking sector. Some of the above studies work out the power law exponent and
they are usually in the range between 2 - 3. Therefore, these interbank markets
are characterised by a couple of large banks with many interbank connections
together with many small banks with only a few interbank connections. Some
other interbank markets have been found to have a network that is characterised
by a degree distribution that is less than a scale-free topology, but is more than
a random network. This is sometimes referred to as a tiering structure and this
network topology is found in the Italian overnight money market by Iori, De-
Masi, Precup, Gabbi, and Caldarelli (2008) and the UK interbank market by
Wells (2002).
Other studies that analyse the network topology of some large value payment
systems in a number of countries also show that those network often exhibit a
scale-free topology. These include Becher, Millard, and Soramaki (2008) looking
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at the the CHAPS in the UK; Soramaki, Bech, Arnold, Glass, and Beyeler (2007)
studying the US FedWire System and Embree and Roberts (2009) analysiing the
LVTS in Canada.
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At the knowledge of using network topology to represent the interbank market
structure, there are two strands of literature, summarised by Upper (2011). One
is empirical, which is to use data on actual exposures to test for possibility of
contagion. This shows whether a given banking system is prone to contagion, but
it does not help us understand how particular features of the interbank market
make it more prone to contagion. The second strand is to use the tools of network
analysis to analyse complex artificial networks with the aim of detecting patterns
which could make them prone to contagion.
2.3.1 Summary of findings
Some of the earliest empirical studies focus on the payment system in the inter-
bank lending market. In these studies, the channel of financial contagion arises
from the default of one participant in the clearing system triggering further de-
faults of at least one other participants via the payment system. Humphrey
(1986) studies the Clearinghouse Interbank Payment Systems (CHIPS) in the
U.S. The CHIPS, being the main clearing house in the United States, helps settle
and clear interbank transactions. By simulating a settlement failure of a major
participant in the CHIPS, the author studies the effect of the simulated failure
has on the whole payment system. He shows that a settlement failure of a major
bank has a huge effect on the system and can give rise to further rounds of set-
tlement failures. Using a similar approach, Angelini, Maresca, and Russo (1996)
studies the Italian intra-day netting arrangement system. According to their sim-
ulations, the number of systemic crises and the magnitude of the systemic crises
are both small, meaning that there is little evidence to support that the inter-
bank payment system is likely to be a channel for systemic crisis to spread. they
argue that their findings were different from those of Humphrey (1986) due to a
number of factors including the frequency of the interbank transaction, the size of
the interbank exposures and the structure of the interbank lending market being
examined. Although the two studies present opposite findings with regard to the
potential of the propagation of systemic risk through payment system, the fact
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that these two interbank markets are different in terms of structure, size and so
on shed some light on the empirical analyses for interbank market, highlighting
the importance of the specifics of the market structure.
The most common approach for empirical work to study the systemic risk in
real-world interbank network is based on collecting (and estimating if necessary)
the complete bilateral interbank exposures in a banking system and using simu-
lation methodologies to study the number of defaults in a banking system under
different scenarios. The first step of this approach is to work out the network
structure of the interbank market using banks’ bilateral exposures. As men-
tioned above, most of the existing empirical studies suffer from data limitations
with only a few exceptions. Blavarg and Nimander (2002) study the Swedish
interbank market and point out that Riksbank, a non-supervisory central bank
in Sweden, has the legal right to request for any information directly from the
financial institutions in Sweden. As a result, complete data is available on the
counterparts for four major Swedish bank. Therefore, they study the interbank
exposures among these four Swedish banks and investigate the systemic risk in
the Swedish interbank market. They find that the direct loss triggered by the
default of a large Swedish bank is low and, in most cases, would not affect the
ability of other banks to maintain their Tier 1 capital ratio with respect to the
regulatory requirement. On this account, they suggest that direct contagion in
the Swedish banking system is possible but unlikely. Lubloy (2004) states the
fact that all banks in Hungary have to report the volume of their daily transac-
tions, their counter-parties and the type of transactions. As a result, a unique
set of data on the interbank transaction can be obtained. It shows that the po-
tential of systemic risk in the Hungarian interbank market is low. The Italian
interbank market is the other market where complete bilateral exposures data is
collected. This is because, as Mistrulli (2011) points out, since January 1989, all
Italian banks are required to submit their end-of-month bilateral exposures with
all other banks to the Bank of Italy. The paper demonstrates that the Italian
interbank market is a channel for financial contagion. However, even for high
loss rates, bank failures are still not likely to end up as a systemic crisis. Only in
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some extreme cases, the severity of financing contagion seems considerable.
In the presence of complete bilateral interbank exposures, the three studies
are suggesting that although the interbank market can be a potential channel for
financial contagion, the likelihood of the contagious spread of systemic risk is low
in all the countries examined. In the absence of complete data, empirical studies
on bilateral interbank exposures use one of the two approaches to overcome this
constraint. Firstly, empirical work can be carried out on a specific segment of
the market, in which all bilateral exposures are available. This is the approach
taken in Furfine (2003). Since most of the federal funds transactions are settled
over Fedwire, a Real Time Gross Settlement Funds Transfer system in the United
States. Therefore, he is able to obtain and use this unique set of data from the
overnight federal fund transactions between U.S. banks for a two-month period
in 1998 to study the contagious effect of a significant bank default. He shows that
the likelihood for further rounds of default is low and that the aggregate assets of
the subsequent failing banks only account for no more than 1% of the total assets
of the commercial banking system in the United States. However, one pitfall of
the study, as implied by the approach, is that it does not incorporate the total
interbank exposures in the U.S. banking market and as a result, the study might
have underestimated the likelihood of contagion within the U.S. interbank market
as a whole.
The second approach has been adopted much widely because it allows re-
searchers to include the whole interbank market. It uses a Mathematical tech-
nique called local entropy maximisation, see Fang, Rajasekera, and Tsao (1997)
and Blien and Graef (1997), to estimate the unknown bilateral interbank expo-
sures from the aggregate exposures. By using the entropy maximisation method,
researchers are allowed to create a full matrix of bilateral interbank exposures
between any banks. However, it relies on the assumption that the interbank bor-
rowing and lending is as evenly as possible. Once the bilateral exposure matrix
is estimated, the next step is to simulate contagion in the interbank market. A
majority of the papers consider an idiosyncratic shock that hits one of the banks
to the extent that the bank defaults. They then examine whether the default
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of the first bank will result in the default in its counter-parties through their
interbank exposures. Among these papers, most of them use an exogenous pa-
rameter the ‘loss-given-default’ (LGD), θ, which determines the amount of asset
loss when a bank defaults. Therefore, by applying an idiosyncratic shock on a
random bank, together with a particular LGD, these papers aim to study the
probability and severity of the systemic risk in the interbank markets. There-
fore, they try to investigate how likely a financial contagion can take place as
a result of a bank defaulting and when this happens, how severe the problem
is. However, due to the differences in the network structure across different in-
terbank markets; the completeness of information collected; and the variations
in the methodologies applied, these studies come up with different findings and
arrive at different conclusions, providing an ambiguous picture as to whether the
interbank market is conducive to contagious defaults. On the positive side, the
majority of these papers find that the probability of a systemic event is low and
that the scope of contagion is limited. For example, Sheldon and Maurer (1998),
Amundsen and Arnt (2005) and Toivanen (2009) all show that a systemic failure
arising from the idiosyncratic default of one bank is unlikely for the Swiss, Danish
and Finnish banking system respectively. This means that the knock-on effect
caused by the initial default bank is small, even if the unexpected failure bank
is a major bank of the system. But Sheldon and Maurer (1998) point out that
in some rare occasions, it is not impossible for the contagious effects to affect
the whole system and when it does, the effect can be quite substantial. Degryse
and Nguyen (2007) also find the Belgian banking system faces very little risk of
danger of contagion. However, they only consider the interbank exposures among
the banks within Belgium and those only account for 15% of the total interbank
exposures in the market. Therefore, it is questionable whether a default of any of
those international banks with large interbank exposure will pose a much greater
threat to the stability of the system. On the other hand, Upper and Worms
(2004) illustrate that the German interbank market is conducive for contagion.
The bankruptcy of a single bank can affect a huge part of the system through
interbank exposures. They show that in some rare cases, the default of a bank
in the system can wipe out 15% of the total assets in the system. Wells (2004)
and van Lelyveld and Liedorp (2006) argue that although likelihood and severity
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of contagion is low, the failure of one of the large banks in the system result in a
substantial weakening of the stability of the banking system, for example in terms
of the capital holdings of banks connected to the defaulted bank. This makes the
weakened banks very susceptible for further rounds attack.
Most of the empirical papers mentioned above focus on the idiosyncratic at-
tack on a random bank in the system. Although this is feasible in real life, it is
more often seen that a part of the banking system experiences a systemic shock,
especially for those banks that have correlation with each other, for example in-
vesting in similar goods or industry. As Elsinger, Lehar, and Summer (2006a),
Elsinger, Lehar, and Summer (2006b) and Frisell, Holmfeld, Larsson, Omberg,
and Persson (2007) studying the Austrian, UK and Swedish banking system,
point out that the study of systemic risk in the interbank market should not
limit itself to the bilateral interbank exposures alone. This is because common
exposures that some, if not all, banks face play an important role in the stability
of the system. Elsinger, Lehar, and Summer (2006a) find that the correlation in
banks’ asset portfolios dominates contagion as the main source of systemic risk.
And Elsinger, Lehar, and Summer (2006b) argue that those empirical studies that
ignore the common exposures are likely to have underestimated the probability
and severity of financial contagion. Upper (2011) provides a detailed summary
and comparison of the methodologies, data and findings of the available empirical
research on individual interbank market.
Halaj and Kok (2013) attempt to use a different approach to tackle the prob-
lem. They collect the aggregate interbank exposure of 27 national central banks
of the European Union and the European Central Bank. Using all these aggre-
gate interbank exposures, they generate many different possible interbank net-
works and investigate the severity of systemic risk in different network structures.
They find that some network structures are less conducive to contagious default.
Although these structures not necessarily coincidence with the real-world inter-
bank network structure, their findings do raise the question of whether a shift in
real-world interbank network structure can increases the resistance of the system
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against future attack.
2.3.2 Problems
Although the literature review on the empirical studies of the systemic risk in the
interbank markets above has broadened us with the understanding on the net-
work structures of the interbank market in various countries and the likelihood
and seriousness of contagious defaults via interbank exposures, these analyses are
not without their problems.
First of all, each of these analyses is based of the interbank exposure data in a
specific country over a specific period of time under examination. Therefore, the
results and conclusions from these empirical studies are difficult to be generalised
and to be applied to other countries that were not examined. Secondly, as men-
tioned previously, since the bilateral interbank exposures between banks are often
not available, therefore, a majority of these papers suffer from data limitation in
obtaining the complete bilateral interbank exposure matrix. Some papers choose
to focus on a particular segment of the market include Furfine (2003), Amundsen
and Arnt (2005) and Iori, De-Masi, Precup, Gabbi, and Caldarelli (2008) and
they all use the data on overnight transactions. Hence, their analyses may have
underestimated the potential of contagion by ignoring the rest of the exposures.
Most of the other papers use the maximum entropy techniques in estimating the
complete bilateral matrix. Mistrulli (2011) test the method of maximum entropy
techniques against observed bilateral interbank exposures. The author finds that
the method has a tendency in underestimating the potential of contagion. This
is because the maximum entropy method relies on the assumption that the banks
spread their interbank borrowing and lending as widely as possible across all other
banks. But the author also points out that the maximum entropy technique can
occasionally overvalue the severity of contagion, depending on features like the
network structure of the interbank market under examination, banks’ recovery
rates and their capitalisation. Overall, the paper shows that the method intro-
duces bias into the analysis. The finding is also supported by Frisell, Holmfeld,
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Larsson, Omberg, and Persson (2007), in which the author shows that the bilat-
eral interbank exposures between banks exhibit high degree of asymmetry. This
contradicts with the assumption in the maximum entropy method and challenges
the validity of the use of the method. Thirdly, most of these studies use a specific
value for the loss-given-default (LGD) to generate sequential default. Although
they run the simulations for different values of LGD, they assumed it to be con-
stant over time. Unfortunately, Memmel and Sachs (2013) show that the assump-
tion of a constant LGD is not realistic and may introduce bias into the analysis.
They find that the assumption has two opposing effects on the system depending
of its stability. They find that, for a rather stable system, the assumption of
a constant LGD tends to underestimate the extent of contagion, whereas for a
rather unstable system, the assumption of a constant LGD tends to overestimate
the extent of contagion. Fourthly, Elsinger, Lehar, and Summer (2006b) demon-
strate that the incorporation of both interbank exposure and common exposure
as systemic shock affects the assessment of the potential and severity of contagion
in the interbank market. The failure in capturing common exposure and correla-
tion between banks are likely to have resulted in an under-evaluation of financial
contagion. Finally, the stability of the interbank market is driven by many deter-
minants, but not solely by its topology. Haldane and May (2011), Cont, Santos,
and Moussa (2013) and Sachs (2013) argue that the number, the size and the
distribution of bank’s interbank linkages are important determinants and affect
the stability of the interbank system. Memmel and Sachs (2013) also find that
bank’s capitalisation is identified as a crucial determinant. Mart´ınez-Jaramillo,
Alexandrova-Kabadjova, Bravo-Benitez, and Solorzano-Margain (2012) illustrate
that the probability distribution of the initial shocks, the size of the losses and
the correlation level of joint failures are also important factors.
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In consequence of the restrictions and problems with the empirical work, another
strand of study in the systemic risk of the interbank market is from a theoretical
perspective. There are many theoretic work on the financial system. However, I
will limit our attention to those focusing specifically on the interbank market. In
broad, these studies create different network structures in representing the inter-
bank linkages between banks and investigate the potential of contagion through
different forms of idiosyncratic or systemic shock. One of the advantages of these
studies is that they can investigate lots of different network topologies, comparing
their stability and efficiency. By doing so, they can also study the effect of those
determinants that govern the severity of a contagious default in the interbank
system and they can arrive at some general results for any specific network.
Iori, Jafarey, and Padilla (2006) create a banking system in which banks are
randomly connected. They simulate the use of interbank market as a result of a
shortage in liquidity in banks. This liquidity shortage arises from the fluctuation
in the customers’ deposits. They first study the effect of the connectivity pa-
rameter in a random network structure with homogeneous banks and show that
there is a monotonic decrease in the default of banks as the connectivity increases.
They also show that increasing a reserve requirement produces a non-monotonic
effect on the stability of the system and explain that the increase in reserve level
interact with banks on an individual level, allowing them to be better insulated
against liquidity shortage, and with the banking system as a whole, restricting
the interbank activity. They later introduce heterogeneity in the system, in terms
of size of bank and size of investment opportunity and illustrate that heterogene-
ity seems to increase the potential for contagion. Nier, Yang, Yorulmazer, and
Alentorn (2008) and Gai and Kapadia (2010) also look specifically at a random
network structure of the interbank market. But they differ from Iori, Jafarey,
and Padilla (2006) in a number of of ways. Firstly, they consider a static model
of interbank market. Secondly, they assume an amount of total interbank assets
and allocate them evenly among the number of links in the system. Thirdly, they
consider an idiosyncratic shock that hit one of the banks at random and remove
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all of its external assets. Nier, Yang, Yorulmazer, and Alentorn (2008) investigate
the interaction between a number of determinants in the system and the their
effects on contagion. They show that connectivity or interbank connection has
two opposing effects on the system. This is because the access of the interbank
market not only allow deficit banks to borrow liquidity from others, it also expo-
sures the creditor banks to contagious risk when the lender banks default. They
are unable to obtain an optimal value of connectivity that gives the least default
in the system. They also show the importance of banks being capitalised, giving
them more protection against the contagious default from the bank that is hit
by the shock. Gai and Kapadia (2010) supports this finding and show that if
banks hold a big amount of capital as their buffer, then they are more resistant
against the domino-effect from the initial defaulting bank and hence, contagion
rarely occurs. However, Gai and Kapadia (2010) take a step further and in-
troduce an aggregate shock that affects the capital holdings of all banks in the
system. They show that in the presence of the aggregate shock, which weakens
the banks’ capital buffer, banks become very susceptible to contagious default if
they have interbank connections with a bank that is hit by the idiosyncratic shock.
As an extension of the model, Nier, Yang, Yorulmazer, and Alentorn (2008)
also consider a tiering structure, in which there is one large bank and 24 small
peripheral banks, all connecting to the large one. However, their analysis is very
brief and contribute little to the understanding of the specifics of the structure
and its stability against systemic risk. Georg (2013) designs a dynamic model of
an interbank market with a central bank and considers three different network
structures, namely the random network, the small-world network and the scale-
free network, summarised by Newman, Baraba´si, and Watts (2006). The paper
incorporates both an idiosyncratic shock arising from change in customers deposit
and a common shock arising from risky investment. It illustrates that contagion
effect is most severe on a random network and least severe on a scale-free network
while the effect on a small-world network is somewhere in between. The findings
on the effect of common shock on the system coincidences with Gai and Kapadia
(2010) that knocking off part of banks’ capital results in a weakening impact on
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the system and makes banks more vulnerable to contagion.
Unlike the above, Ladley (2013) considers a circular network structure of
banks and the distance between two entities governs the ability of one bank be-
ing able to borrow from the others through the interbank market. In this study,
the idiosyncratic shock is a complete wipe out of a bank’s equity and reserve. It
shows that the stability of the system is at its weakest at low-intermediate levels
of connectivity. This coincidences with the finding from Gai and Kapadia (2010).
Ladley (2013) also investigate the relationship between connectivity and conta-
gious defaults in the presence of a systemic shock, which affects the probability
of a bank’s investment project to mature successfully and shows that the severity
of contagion depends on the size of the systemic shock. He concludes that there
is not an optimal connectivity that gives the least spread of contagion. This is
because the size of the shock is unknown. The paper then turns the attention
to the role of regulation in an interbank market and how can regulation be used
to minimise the impact of contagion. It first shows that an increase in the level
of equity ratio can reduce the contagious defaults significantly. The drawback is
that it also reduces the interbank transaction. It next examines the reserve ratio
and shows that tightening the reserve requirement increases the severity of conta-
gion. The explanation is that although an increase in the reserve ratio demands
banks to retain a higher proportion of their customers’ deposit as reserve, this
also leads to an increase in interbank borrowings for investment. Therefore, the
increase in interbank activity exposes the banking system to contagious defaults.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter surveys the literature on the study of the financial contagion in the
interbank market. It first illustrates the use of network topology to represent the
network structure of interbank market. It then presents the empirical and theo-
retical approaches in examining the financial contagion in the interbank market.
22
2.5 Conclusion
The empirical studies show that the most commonly found network structure
in the real-world interbank markets are scale-free network and tiering network
(or sometimes referred as money-centre network). Although the majority of these
studies find that the probability of a contagion spread via interbank exposures is
low, it is nevertheless possible and can be quite severe when it happens. Besides,
it has been pointed out that these empirical work suffers from limitations and
may underestimate the potential and severity of contagious defaults. Therefore,
the second strand of literature which attempts to study the interbank market
from a theoretical perspective complements the drawbacks in empirical studies.
In the past decade, there has been a growth in using network topology in studying
financial networks. However, when the research first began, there were not many
theoretical models that study specifically on the interbank market. For example,
Iori, Jafarey, and Padilla (2006) and Nier, Yang, Yorulmazer, and Alentorn (2008)
both consider a random network structure for the interbank market. Therefore,
this research takes Iori, Jafarey, and Padilla (2006) as the starting point.
23
Chapter 3
The Basic Model: Iori, Jafarey,
and Padilla (2006)
3.1 Introduction
Iori, Jafarey, and Padilla (2006) simulate interbank transactions between banks
to deal with the liquidity shortage. This research aims to use a similar approach
to study a banking system with interbank transactions, therefore this chapter
presents the implementation of Iori, Jafarey, and Padilla (2006)’s model.
3.2 Definition of liquidity
In banking, the term liquidity of a bank refers to its availability of liquid cash to
meet financial obligations when they come due. Financial obligations can be of
short-term and long-term. While some of them have an agreed due date, others
can be exercised by the creditors at any time. Hence, banks must maintain
a sufficient amount of liquidity within themselves. A bank’s liquidity can be
interpreted as its liquid assets. In financial accounting, the mathematical formula
for balance sheet is given by
Equity = Assets− Liabilities
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Liabilities of a bank refer to loans that are deposited in the bank by other
entities, including individual customers, companies or other banks while assets
can consist of bank’s investments, loans lend to other parties and reserves. Some
of these assets like investments or loans are illiquid whereas reserves are liquid.
Therefore, the term ‘assets’ is split into two terms in the formula.
Equity = (Liquid assets+ Illiquid assets)− Liabilities
Liquid assets consist of reserves and any other liquid assets that a bank holds,
for example cash holdings. Therefore, liquidity refers to all these liquid assets.
The mathematical formula can be refined as
Equity = (Liquidity + Illiquid assets)− Liabilities
By rearranging the above formula, we can express the term liquidity as
Liquidity = Equity + Liabilities− Illiquid assets
Therefore, the definition of ‘liquidity’ of a bank in the model is considered as
the sum of the bank’s equity and liabilities net its illiquid assets.
3.3 Overview of the model
Having defined the term ‘liquidity’, this section provides an overview of Iori, Ja-
farey, and Padilla (2006)’s model. This model simulates a system of banks that
uses interbank transactions to manage their liquidity needs. It investigates both
the positive and negative effects of the usage of interbank transactions to the
banking system.
In this model, banks receive deposits from customers on a daily basis and
the amount of deposits fluctuates from one day to another. Deposits made are
short-term and customers have the right to withdraw their deposits at any time.
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As a result, liquidity shortage can arise from the change in deposit and with-
drawal patterns of customers. Hence, banks must maintain a certain level of
liquid resources within themselves. At the same time, banks invest a portion of
these funds into productive projects. In general, investment projects are usually
long-term and the resources invested are often tied up with the investment, in
the sense that banks are unable to retrieve those resources until the investment
matures. Hence, these resources are classified as illiquid. It is of the banks’ inter-
est to maintain a balance between their liquid and illiquid resources. However,
if the overall deposit is negative, meaning that there are more withdrawal than
deposits, and to the extent that it is more than the liquid reserve a bank keeps,
then that bank would not be able to meet its customers’ demand.
In the absence of an interbank market, banks with liquidity shortage are clas-
sifed as default. However, in the presence of an interbank market, deficit banks
are allowed to borrow funds from other banks through interbank transactions to
deal with their liquidity shortage. If banks are unable to request and arrange
enough interbank loans, then their inability to meet their customers’ demands
will result in default. This model studies the incorporation of interbank transac-
tions among banks.
Figure 3.1 and 3.2 present the flowchart of how banks operate in the absence
and presence of interbank transactions respectively.
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Figure 3.1: How banks operate in the absence of interbank transactions
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Figure 3.2: How banks operate in the presence of interbank transactions
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3.4 Implementation
3.4.1 Construction of a banking system
In order to implement Iori, Jafarey, and Padilla (2006) model, a system of banks
has to be constructed.
Let’s consider a system of M banks. Relationships between these M banks
are presented in a connectivity matrix, Jij for i = 1, 2, ...,M and j = 1, 2, ...,M .
Each element in this connectivity matrix can only take one of the two values, 0
or 1 and the value it takes is used to define whether the two banks are connected
to each other.
Jij = 1 indicates that bank i and bank j are in connection and interbank
transactions can be arranged between themselves while Jij = 0 represents that
bank i and bank j are not linked to each other and hence they cannot arrange
interbank transactions. Below is a display of a connectivity matrix for a system
of 4 banks.

J11 J12 J13 J14
J21 J22 J23 J24
J31 J32 J33 J34
J41 J42 J43 J44

It is assumed that ‘relationship’ is non-directional, therefore, if two banks
are connected, then both parties can be a borrower or a lender in an interbank
transaction. A bank cannot arrange interbank transaction with itself, therefore,
Jij = 0 if i = j. Therefore, the connectivity matrix can be simplified into

0 J12 J13 J14
J12 0 J23 J24
J13 J23 0 J34
J14 J24 J34 0

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At the very beginning of the simulation, the values for the connectivity matrix
Jij ∀i 6= j are generated randomly. The parameter C denotes the probability that
Jij = Jji = 1 for any two banks i and j. For the purpose of simulations, a random
number will be drawn for each pair of bank i and j. If the random number is
less than or equal to C, then bank i and j are connected. On the contrary, if the
random number drawn exceeds C, then bank i and j are not connected. Since
matrix J is a square, symmetrical matrix, one only has to generate random num-
bers to determine the elements in either the upper or lower triangular matrix,
excluding the diagonal, but not both.
3.4.2 Model operation in the absence of interbank market
The model operates in discrete time, which is denoted by t = 0, 1, 2, .... The list
of events that take place at different times of a day in the absence of interbank
transaction is summarised below.
When a bank opens, it first receives deposits and withdrawals from its cus-
tomers. It then pays out interest to the depositors in the previous period. After
that, it receives the income from investment made in the last τ periods, together
with the initial capital from the matured investment made in t = −τ . When the
bank closes, it pays out dividend and undertakes new investment, provided that
it satisfies some regulatory requirements. In the absence of interbank transaction,
a bank defaults if it has negative liquidity at the end of the day.
Initiation of bank size and average investment opportunity
At the very beginning of time, that is, t = 0, there are M number of banks in
the system. Each of these banks is denoted by k, where k = 1, 2, ...,M .
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The size of bank k is denoted by Sk and the heterogeneity in bank size is
given by
Sk = |S¯ + σSυ| (3.1)
where S¯ is the average bank size, σS is the standard deviation of bank size across
banks and υ ∼ N(0, 1). The size of bank k’s average investment opportunity is
denoted by O¯k and the heterogeneity in investment opportunity across banks is
given by
O¯k = δ × |Sk + σOν| (3.2)
where ν ∼ N(0, 1) and σO is the standard deviation of average investment oppor-
tunity across banks and δ is the aggregate investment opportunity : aggregate
bank size ratio with 0 < δ < 1. The banks’ sizes and their average investment
opportunities are generated before the initial period.
Receipt or withdrawal of deposit
Some notations are given below: Dkt represents the total deposit made by the
customers in bank k at time t, Ekt denotes bank k
′s equity at time t and Ikt de-
notes the total amount of investment made by bank k in the last t− τ periods.
In each period, a number of activities take place. For simplicity, these activi-
ties are assumed to follow a specific sequence. At the beginning of each period t,
each bank possesses certain amount of liquid assets, depending on the deposit it
received and the investment it made in the previous period t−1. Bank k’s initial
liquidity is given by
Lkt−1 = D
k
t−1 + E
k
t−1 −
τ∑
s=1
Ikt−s (3.3)
Each bank k receives new deposits and withdrawals from its customers. The
total amount of deposits net withdrawals is given by Dkt . This amount changes
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everyday and its fluctuation is random, and according to Iori, Jafarey, and Padilla
(2006), it is modelled in one of the two ways. Firstly, the fluctuation in deposits
for bank k is proportional to the square root of its size and is specified by
Dkt = |Sk + σD
√
Skt| (3.4)
Alternatively, the fluctuation in deposits for bank k is proportional to its size
and is given by
Dkt = |Sk + σDSkt| (3.5)
where t ∼ N(0, 1). A bank then has to pay out interest to its depositors in the
previous period. The interest rate for deposits is assumed to be fixed over time
and across banks and it is denoted by rD. Therefore, if bank k received a deposit
of Dkt−1 at t− 1, it has to pay out a total interest of rDDkt−1 at t to its customers,
regardless of withdrawal.
Receipt of investment income and matured investment
If a bank made an investment in any of the last τ periods, it receives an income
from its investment. This income is assumed to be a fixed proportion of its invest-
ment, meaning that the investment is risk-free. This fixed proportion is denoted
by rI and is assumed to be constant over time and across banks. Therefore, at
any time t, bank k receives an income of rI
∑τ
s=1
Ikt−s. As an investment ma-
tures, a bank also receives the initial capital back. Therefore, if bank k invested
Ikt−τ in t− τ period ago, it receives Ikt−τ .
This completes the description of the events that take place when a bank
opens. The liquidity at closing is given by
Lˆkt = L
k
t−1 + (D
k
t −Dkt−1)− rDDkt−1 + rI
τ∑
s=1
Ikt−s + I
k
t−τ (3.6)
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The equity of bank k at closing, Eˆkt , is given by
Eˆkt = Lˆ
k
t +
τ−1∑
s=1
Ikt−s −Dkt (3.7)
If the change in net deposit for bank k between t−1 and t is negative and the
magnitude is large enough, bank k can result in negative liquidity. In the absence
of interbank market, the bank with negative liquidity does not have any channels
to borrow funds to recover its liquidity shortage and is therefore considered as
default.
Regulatory requirement
For those banks that survive this current period, they close and two events take
place. If a bank is performing well and it is making profit from its investment, it
is required to pay out dividend to its shareholders. However, it is crucial for the
bank to satisfy some regulatory requirements. The first one that Iori, Jafarey, and
Padilla (2006) consider is “excess” return, which is denoted Exkt . This “excess”
return is calculated by dividing its equity by its current deposit holdings and
therefore Exkt at any time t is given by
Exkt = Eˆ
k
t /D
k
t (3.8)
In order to satisfy this requirement, the “excess” return must exceed the target
capital:deposit ratio, χ. Secondly, a bank should maintain some liquid resources
within itself and these resources are classified as reserves. These reserves can be
used in unforeseen circumstances. At any time t, a bank’s reserve requirement is
calculated as a portion of its current deposits from customers and it is given as
Rkt = βD
k
t (3.9)
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where β is the reserve requirement ratio.
Dividend payment and investment
Hence, bank k can only pay out dividend if equation (3.8) satisfies the target
capital:deposit ratio. And when it does, the actual dividend payment is given by
Divkt = max{0,min[rI
τ∑
s=1
Ikt−s − rDDkt−1, Lˆkt −Rkt , Lˆkt +
τ−1∑
s=1
Ikt−s − (1 + χ)Dkt ]}
(3.10)
There are three terms in the minimum bracket in the above formulation. The
first term rI
τ∑
s=1
Ikt−s − rDDkt−1 refers to the net profit of the bank. The second
term Lˆkt −Rkt represents the available liquidity net reserve requirement. The third
term Lˆkt +
τ−1∑
s=1
Ikt−s− (1+χ)Dkt ] can be rewritten as Eˆkt −χDkt ] which ensures that
the bank satisfies the excess return.
However, if it does not meet the regulatory requirements, it does not pay out
any dividend. Therefore if Exkt ≤ χ, then Divkt = 0. After making dividend
payment, the liquidity of a bank gets updated and it is
L˘kt = Lˆ
k
t −Divkt (3.11)
Since a bank has to maintain a minimum reserve level, its available liquidity for
investment is given by its current liquidity net its reserves, that is, L˘kt −Rkt . Then,
banks can consider investing in fresh investment projects. The average investment
opportunity for each bank, O¯k, is generated at the beginning of the simulation
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and is given in equation (3.2). In each period t, the actual maximum investment
opportunity, ωkt , available to each bank k fluctuates and the fluctuations are
proportional to its average investment opportunity. This is given as
ωkt = |O¯k + σωO¯kηt| (3.12)
where σω is the standard deviation of the fluctuation in investment over time and
ηt ∼ N(0, 1)
Undertaking new investment is a beneficial way for a bank to make profit.
Ideally, a bank would invest up to its maximum investment opportunity. However,
investment does not mature until τ period later and hence when resources are used
for investment, they are classified as illiquid. For this reason, a bank must not
use its reserve for investment. Therefore, bank k will undertake new investment
based on its maximum investment opportunity and its available liquidity and this
is given by
Ikt = min[max(0, L˘
k
t −Rkt ), ωkt ] (3.13)
After the dividend is paid and new investment is made, it comes to the end
of the period t. The liquidity and equity of bank k after dividend and investment
are given respectively as
Lkt = L˜
k
t − Ikt (3.14)
Ekt = L
k
t +
τ−1∑
s=0
Ikt−s −Dkt (3.15)
This completes the description of how the bank system operates in the ab-
sence of interbank market. The whole cycle will re-start again for the next period,
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except for those banks that default.
3.4.3 Introduction of an interbank market
The introduction of an interbank market does not change the list of events that
take place during the day. However, when the bank closes, the first priority of
the bank is to repays its interbank loans to its lenders (if it is able to repay in
full). It then pays out dividend and undertakes new investments, again assuming
that it satisfies the regulatory requirements. If the bank has liquidity shortage,
it can attempt to arrange and borrow through interbank market. It then repays
any outstanding interbank loans from previous period.
In the presence of interbank market, a bank can borrow (lend) interbank
loans from (to) its connected banks. Therefore, at the beginning of each period
t, the amount of liquid assets a bank possesses not only depends on the deposit
it received and the investment it made in the previous period t− 1, but also the
interbank loans it borrowed (lent) in the previous period. The total interbank
borrowing and lending of bank k at any time t are denoted by IBkt and IL
k
t
respectively. Therefore, unlike equation (3.3), at the beginning of the period,
bank k’s liquidity is given by
Lkt−1 = D
k
t−1 + E
k
t−1 + IB
k
t−1 − ILkt−1 −
τ∑
s=1
Ikt−s (3.16)
The events that take place during the day are identical regardless of the pres-
ence of interbank transactions. Therefore, a bank receives deposit and with-
drawals from its customers, pays out interest to the depositors in the previous
period, receives income from investment and receives the initial capital when an
investment matures. After these events, the liquidity of a bank is the same as
equation (3.6).
Repayment of interbank loans
Banks close at the end of the day. In the presence of interbank transactions,
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banks’ first priority now is to repay their interbank loans in full if there are any.
If bank k arranged any interbank borrowings in the previous period, it must at-
tempt to repay its creditors at this stage. IT kjt−1 denotes the interbank transaction
between bank k and j at t−1. If IT kjt−1 is positive, it means that bank k borrowed
from bank j and if IT kjt−1 is negative, it means that bank k lent to bank j. Besides,
IT kjt−1 ≡ 0 if k = j
The interbank transactions between banks can be presented in a matrix. Be-
low is a illustration of a system of 4 banks.

0 IT 12t−1 IT
13
t−1 IT
14
t−1
IT 21t−1 0 IT
23
t−1 IT
24
t−1
IT 31t−1 IT
32
t−1 0 IT
34
t−1
IT 41t−1 IT
42
t−1 IT
43
t−1 0

There are always two counter-parties in an interbank transaction, therefore,
if bank k borrowed from bank j, it means that bank j lent to bank k, and so
IT kjt−1 = −IT jkt−1. Hence, the interbank transaction matrix can be simplified into

0 IT 12t−1 IT
13
t−1 IT
14
t−1
−IT 12t−1 0 IT 23t−1 IT 24t−1
−IT 13t−1 −IT 23t−1 0 IT 34t−1
−IT 14t−1 −IT 24t−1 −IT 34t−1 0

It is assumed that a bank can either be a creditor or a debtor, but cannot be
both creditor and debtor in the same period. This means that, for a bank k, the
values of all IT kjt ∀j 6= k should take the same sign at any time t.
M∑
j=1
IT kjt =
{
IBkt if k borrows
−ILkt if k lends
37
3.4 Implementation
At this stage, it is assumed that it is the borrower banks’ highest priority to
repay their interbank loans from the previous period in full if possible. If they are
unable to repay their debt in full, it is assumed that those banks do not repay for
the time being, but instead they issue debt certificates to their creditors. These
debt certificates are to be redeemed before the beginning of next period and they
should still reflect in the banks’ liquidity. Therefore, if bank k was a borrower,
regardless of whether it can repay or it cannot repay but issue debt certificates,
its liquidity is
L˘kt = Lˆ
k
t − (1 + rB)IBkt−1 (3.17)
However, if bank k was a lender, its liquidity holding only gets updated when
it receives the repayment from its debtors. For example, if bank j borrowed from
bank k and it repays now, then the liquidity of bank k is given by
L˘kt = Lˆ
k
t + (1 + rB)IT
kj
t−1 (3.18)
After this, the equity for any bank k is
E˘kt = L˘
k
t +
τ−1∑
s=1
Ikt−s + IB
k
t − ILkt −Dkt (3.19)
Dividend payment and investment
Banks then pay out dividend and make new investments. The description for
these two events is the same as before except for formulation for dividend pay-
ment. Therefore, equations (3.8) to (3.15) remain unchanged except equation
(3.10). Previously, the dividend payment is made with respect to a bank’s profit,
that is, its income from investment net the interest it pays to depositors, subject
to the reserve requirement and the target capital:deposit ratio. However, when
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there exists interbank transactions, the interbank interest that a bank receives
(pays) for being an interbank lender (borrower) is considered as profit (loss) and
therefore should be taken into account in the formulation of dividend payment.
As a result, the refined formula for dividend payment therefore is
Divkt = max{0,min[rI
τ∑
s=1
Ikt−s+rB(IL
k
t−1−IBkt−1)−rDDkt−1, L˘kt−Rkt , L˘kt+
τ−1∑
s=1
Ikt−s−(1+χ)Dkt ]}
(3.20)
Hence, equation (3.10) is replaced by (3.20).
Arrangement of interbank transactions
In the absence of interbank transaction, the description would stop here and
banks with negative liquidity would have to default. Luckily, if banks are allowed
to attempt to borrow from others, they have a chance to survive if they are able
to arrange enough interbank transaction(s) from one or more of its connected
banks. For simulation purpose, it is assumed that a bank k with liquidity need
approaches its connected banks j in a random manner. The two banks then
negotiate for the amount to be transacted. This amount is assumed to be the
minimum value between the liquidity need of bank k and the available liquidity
of bank j net its reserve. This is given by
IT kjt = min[|L˘kt |, L˘jt −Rjt ] (3.21)
The arranged interbank loans do not get transacted until bank k manages
to line up enough loans to cover its liquidity need. When it does, the liquidity
holdings for both the borrower (bank k) and its lenders are updated accordingly.
It is assumed that bank k only borrows what it needs and therefore, its liquidity
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becomes Lkt = 0. For its creditors, their liquidity will become
L`jt = L˘
j
t − IT kjt (3.22)
There are only two ways in which a bank can end up with liquidity need at
the end of the ‘day time’. Firstly, if banks face a big negative change in net de-
posit, this can result in a negative liquidity. But if these banks manage to borrow
interbank loans, they survive this current period and nothing more needs to be
done.
However, the second case is that if banks have a low but positive liquidity
resulting from the change in net deposit and if this prevents them from repaying
their interbank loans from the previous period, they would have ended up with
negative liquidity and have issued debt certificate to their creditors. In this case,
when these banks manage to arrange enough interbank loans, they have to repay
their interbank loans to their creditors from the previous period by redeeming
these debt certificates. As a result, the liquidity holdings of these creditors should
be updated. If bank j lent interbank loans to bank k in the previous period and
bank k failed to repay the loans in full earlier, the liquidity of bank j is now
Ljt = L`
j
t + (1 + rB)IT
kj
t−1 (3.23)
The process of arranging interbank transaction, giving by equation (3.21) to
(3.23), keeps reiterating until either there are no more banks with negative liquid-
ity or there are no more potentials lenders available to banks with liquidity need.
In the former case, all banks survive this current period and proceed to the next
period whereas in the latter case, those banks which fail to borrow default and
are removed from the system. For simplicity, the liquidation of a defaulted bank
is not considered in the model. Therefore, a credit bank j which lent interbank
loans to the defaulted bank k is assumed to suffer a loss of (1 + rB)IT
kj
t−1 because
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they are unable to receive the interbank transaction plus interest.
3.5 Conclusion
In order to study the stability of the banking system in the presence of an inter-
bank market and to investigate the role of the reserve requirement and capital
adequacy requirement, this research has taken the approach to simulate the inter-
actions between banks in an artificial model. When the research was first carried
out, there were not many other researches that consider constructing an artifi-
cial banking system, in which banks are connected to each other via interbank
transactions and aim to investigate the systemic risk in the interbank market.
To my best knowledge, both Iori, Jafarey, and Padilla (2006) and Nier, Yang,
Yorulmazer, and Alentorn (2008) have both taken this approach. However, Nier,
Yang, Yorulmazer, and Alentorn (2008) consider a particular moment in which
they randomly default one of the banks and study the knock-on effects on other
banks in the system. Therefore, those banks connected to the defaulted bank
either defaults too if the loss it incurs is large enough or it survives otherwise.
Although this is not unheard of, the model does not allow the researchers to in-
vestigate how these banks may be able to prevent defaulting by making further
interbank borrowings. In other words, the model simply assumes a particular
setting of interbank transactions among banks rather than simulating the use
of interbank transactions based on banks’ needs. Beside, randomly defaulting a
bank does not provide enough economical relevance. However, Iori, Jafarey, and
Padilla (2006) consider a model of banks over a long period of time. In each
period, banks face different fluctuation in customers’ deposit. They are then al-
lowed to make dividend payment and investment and transact with each other
through the interbank market, all based on their liquidity position. This model
allows the researchers to study the interactions of banks through the interbank
market dependent on their needs and the default of banks is caused by the liquid-
ity shortages which arise from the fluctuation in customers’ deposit. Therefore,
Iori, Jafarey, and Padilla (2006) model has been chosen to the first step to the
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research. Hence, the above sections provide a detailed description of the imple-
mentation of the Iori, Jafarey, and Padilla (2006) model.
The terminology ‘liquidity’ may have different meaning in different contexts.
This chapter begins with a clear definition of liquidity for the purpose of this
research and it will be adopted throughout. The definition of ‘liquidity’ of a
bank in the model is considered as the sum of the bank’s equity and liabilities
net its illiquid assets. The chapter then proceeds in giving the description in
constructing a banking system with a random network structure. It is assumed
that banks are randomly connected to each other based on a parameter C. It
then presents the daily operations of banks including the receipt of customers’
deposit, paying out interest to customers, paying dividends to shareholders and
making new investments. All the these events are assumed to take place in an
order. Banks interact with each other through the interbank market when some
banks face liquidity shortage. The aim of the implementation of this model is
to understand how the banks can use the interbank market to deal with the liq-
uidity problem, how frequently they use the interbank market and what are the
potential consequences of the usage of such a market.
Throughout the implementation and simulation of the model, a number of
problems emerged. Therefore, it is impossible to proceed with the implementation
without some adjustments and modifications to the model. The next chapter
first presents all of these issues together with a solution and it then shows some
preliminary results.
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An Extended Model: Correcting
Iori, Jafarey, and Padilla
(2006)
4.1 Introduction
As mentioned in Chapter 3, there are a number of problems that I encountered
when I tried to implement the model in Iori, Jafarey, and Padilla (2006). In this
section, I discuss each other them separately with a modification solution.
4.2 Problems with the implementation
4.2.1 Fluctuation in deposits
In Iori, Jafarey, and Padilla (2006), the authors define two different ways in which
the fluctuation in deposit can be modelled. As described earlier, the two differ-
ent models in the fluctuation in deposits are proportional to the square root of
their size and to their mean size respectively. The two fluctuations are given by
equation (3.4) and (3.5) respectively and they are displayed below.
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Dkt = |Sk + σD
√
Skt|
Dkt = |Sk + σDSkt|
Figure 4.1 illustrates the time series for both fluctuations given by equation
(3.4) and (3.5). It shows that, if the fluctuation is proportional to the square
root of the bank’s size, then it simply fluctuates around the value Sk with small
deviation. If this is used in the implementation to generate customers’ deposit
and withdrawals, then the change in daily deposits from customers would never
have caused a bank to face liquidity shortage, and consequently, there would not
be a need for interbank transactions and there certainly would not have any bank
defaults. Therefore, in my implementation, the fluctuation in deposits is assumed
to be proportional to the bank size only, that is,
Dkt = |Sk + σDSkt|
4.2.2 Capital:deposit ratio
The second problem encountered is the formula for capital:deposit ratio, which
is known as the ‘excess return’ in Iori, Jafarey, and Padilla (2006). In the paper,
the capital:deposit ratio is given by (3.8), which is
Exkt = Eˆ
k
t /D
k
t
From the above formulation, the excess return is calculated based on a bank’s
current equity divided by its customer deposit. Therefore, it can be interpreted as
a behavioural rule for banks in determining the amount of dividend it should pay
with respect to its profits. Although this formulation has its economical relevance,
it does pose a problem in the simulation. The problem with this formulation is
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Figure 4.1: The fluctuation in deposit proportional to either the square root of bank’s size or
the bank size with T = 500, Sk = 1000, σD = 0.5,
that when the deposit is large, the excess return is actually small and is unlikely
to be able to exceed the capital:deposit ratio. As a result, the bank does not make
any dividend payment. This increase in equity increases the bank size and makes
it difficult to analyse and compare between banks. Therefore, it is proposed to
modify the behaviour rule slightly such that it helps to keep the size of banks
remain unchanged. After some considerations, the proposed modification is
Eqkt = Eˆ
k
t /S
k (4.1)
Therefore, the modified formulation can be interpreted as a behaviour rule
that helps banks determine the dividend payment based on its excess equity from
the investment income. The reasoning is as follows. In Iori, Jafarey, and Padilla
(2006), they assume that, for any bank k, the initial deposit equals to its bank
size, that is, Dk0 = S
k and the initial equity equals to 0.3 times the initial de-
posit, that is, Ek0 = 0.3 × Dk0 . In other words, the initial equity also equals to
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0.3 times its bank size, that is, Ek0 = 0.3 × Sk. Iori, Jafarey, and Padilla (2006)
do not specify their choice of the value 0.3. However, this value coincides with
the value they choose for χ, therefore my interpretation is that the initial equity
of a bank equals to χ times its bank size. In the current model, the value for
the equity at any time t only changes if one of the followings happens: a bank’s
equity increases if it receives income from its investment or the equity decreases
if it fails to receive the interbank loan interest from its debtors.
Therefore, if the “excess return” is calculated as the ratio of the bank’s cur-
rent equity to its size and if this value is used to compare with χ, then at any
time t, this can be used to evaluate a bank’s equity, whether it is higher or lower
than its initial period. One of the following cases would take place. Assuming
that a bank makes some profits from its investments, then the income it receives
contributes to the increase in the bank’s equity. As a result, the “excess return”
will be higher than χ, which means that this bank satisfies the regulatory require-
ment and it proceeds to make dividend payment. On the contrary, assuming that
bank suffers a loss from the non-repayment of interbank loans from its debtors,
then its equity decreases. This results in a value of “excess return” lower than χ,
which means that the bank fails to satisfy the requirement and it does not pay
out any dividend in this period. On some occasions, both factors will have an
effect on the bank’s equity at the same period. The two opposing effects should
counteract one another and the net effect determines whether a bank pays out or
retains the dividend.
This amendment manages to achieve the purpose of the regulation, that is, to
allow a bank to make dividend payment when it earns income from its investment
or retains dividends as bank’s equity when it suffers a loss. However, for this rea-
son, χ should no longer be named as the capital:deposit ratio. But instead it will
now be called the equity requirement ratio. And this regulatory requirement will
now be referred as the equity requirement. This is because it aims to monitor a
bank’s equity level.
The formula for dividend payment is given by (3.20) and is displayed below.
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Divkt = max{0,min[rI
τ∑
s=1
Ikt−s−rDDkt−1+rB(ILkt−1−IBkt−1), Lˆkt−Rkt , Lˆkt+
τ−1∑
s=1
Ikt−s−(1+χ)Dkt ]}
There are three terms in the minimum bracket in the above formulation.
The first term rI
τ∑
s=1
Ikt−s − rDDkt−1 + rB(ILkt−1 − IBkt−1) refers to the net profit
of the bank. The second term Lˆkt − Rkt represents the available liquidity net
reserve requirement. The third term in the minimum bracket is introduced in
Iori, Jafarey, and Padilla (2006) such that dividend payment does not violate the
capital:deposit target. This is because it can be arranged as
Lˆkt +
τ−1∑
s=1
Ikt−s − (1 + χ)Dkt = [Lˆkt +
τ−1∑
s=1
Ikt−s −Dkt ]− χDkt
Lˆkt +
τ−1∑
s=1
Ikt−s − (1 + χ)Dkt = Eˆkt − χDkt
Since the regulatory requirement is now a ratio between current equity and
bank size, instead of deposit, therefore, the third terms should be amended to
Eˆkt − χSk. As a result, the updated dividend payment formula is
Divkt = max{0,min[rI
τ∑
s=1
Ikt−s−rDDkt−1+rB(ILkt−1−IBkt−1), Lˆkt −Rkt , Eˆkt −χSk]}
(4.2)
Therefore, the amount of dividend paid is determined by the amount of net
profit a bank made in the last period, provided this amount does not violet the
reserve requirement and the equity requirement.
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4.2.3 Initial values for simulation
In Iori, Jafarey, and Padilla (2006), at t = 0, the authors choose the values of Dk−1,
Ek−1, I
k
−1, I
k
−2 and so on exogenously, but they do not specify what values they use
in their simulations. However, the choice of some of these values, in particular
those investments, are quite critical in initialising the simulations. The liquidity
for any bank at the very beginning is given by (3.16)
Lkt−1 = D
k
t−1 + E
k
t−1 + IB
k
t−1 − ILkt−1 −
τ∑
s=1
Ikt−s
Therefore, if it is assumed that banks made lots of investments in the last
τ periods at t = 0, then the liquidity of these banks are likely to be negative.
In order to avoid this from happening, for simulation purposes, the customers’
deposits in the previous period are assumed to be equivalent to the bank size,
that is, Dk−1 = S
k for all k and that all banks maintained their equity level at
t = −1, that is, Ekt−1 = χ × Sk for all k. It is also assumed that there were no
interbank transactions before the initial period, that is, IBkt−1 = IL
k
t−1 = 0 for
all k. Hence, the liquidity equation can be simplified into
Lkt−1 = S
k + χSk −
τ∑
s=1
Ikt−s
In order to initialise the simulations, the liquidity from t = −1 has to be
greater than or equal to zero for all banks, that is, all banks are not in default
(Lkt−1 ≥ 0), therefore the sum of the values for the previous τ investments must
satisfy the following condition.
τ∑
s=1
Ikt−s ≤ (1 + χ)Sk (4.3)
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A couple of parameters will be studied. In order to be able to isolate and distin-
guish the individual effect of these parameters on the stability of the model, each
of these parameters will be considered separately.
Firstly, a system of 400 banks (that is, N = 400) is studied. In the simula-
tions presented below, unless otherwise stated, the parameters are set as follows:
the size of all banks is Sk = S¯ = 1000, the maturity for investment is τ = 3,
the interest rate for deposit is rD = 0, the investment return is rI = 0.01, the
equity requirement ratio is χ = 0.3, the reserve requirement ratio is β = 0.2, the
interbank interest rate is rB = 0.005 and the aggregate investment opportunity :
aggregate bank size ratio is δ = 0.5.
4.3.1 The effect of connectivity C
I first examine the parameter connectivity and aim to study the benefits or draw-
backs it has on the bank system. There are different possible ways to measure
the advantages or disadvantages a parameter can have on the system. For the
time being, I study the effect of connectivity on the stability of the bank system,
in the sense of the number of banks fail to survive over a time period at different
levels of connectivity.
The effect of connectivity C in the homogeneous case
For the first set of simulations, the only fluctuation is the change in deposit and
withdrawal patterns and σD = 0.5. These 400 banks are homogeneous in the
sense that the initial bank size for each bank is identical (σS = 0), the average in-
vestment opportunity for each bank is identical (σO = 0) and that any individual
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bank’s maximum investment opportunity at each period is the identical (σω = 0).
It is also assumed that each bank k made an investment of half of its av-
erage investment opportunity in the last τ periods, that is, Ikt = 0.5 × Ok for
t = −1,−2, ...,−τ and k = 1, 2, ...,M .
Figure 4.2 illustrates that, under the current scheme for the fluctuations in
customers’ deposit, at C = 0 these 400 banks all default within 50 periods. There
are two reasons for this phenomenon. The obvious one is that when C = 0, banks
are all disconnected from one another, therefore when any of them have a liquid-
ity shortage arising from the fluctuation in customers’ deposit, they immediately
default as they do not have any counterparties which they can borrow interbank
transactions from. The second reason is related to the fact that banks may have
taken up too much investment. In the current setting, a bank is allowed to make
investment as long as it has surplus liquidity above its reserve requirement and
it can take up investment as much as its excess liquidity or its maximum invest-
ment opportunity. This means that there is not a channel to monitor a bank’s
commitment to investment opportunity relative to their funding risk. However,
investment has a maturity of τ periods and hence the liquidity investment is con-
sidered as illiquid. Therefore, this causes in lots of banks defaulting as a result
of liquidity shortage because most of their resources are illiquid. The situation is
worsen together with the fact that they are not connected to each other through
the interbank market. However, in the presence of interbank transactions, that
is at C > 0, banks with liquidity shortage are able to borrow interbank loans
and prevent themselves from bankruptcy, and hence the number of bank default
reduces. More importantly, the higher the level of connectivity, the greater the
number of surviving banks. The flattening part of the curve at C = 0.03 is a
result of the averaging of 100 simulations. In the current setting, all banks will
eventually default, if the simulation is run long enough. However, the fluctuation
in deposit is completely random and in some rare cases, banks do not result in a
negative liquidity until much later or until their connected banks are all defaulted,
therefore these banks manage to survive for a long period. This phenomenon con-
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tributes to the flattened curve.
Table 4.2 shows banks’ activities on investment and interbank transaction at
different level of connectivity. It shows that the average percentage of investment
opportunity fulfilled at different level of connectivity considered is between 64%
to 67%. This will be a good reference for comparison with the heterogeneous
case in average investment opportunity and the heterogeneous case in maximum
investment opportunity over time. The table also shows the interbank activ-
ities between bank. It illustrates that both the average number of interbank
transactions and the average volume of these transaction increase as connectivity
increases. These increases have a positive effect on the stability of the system be-
cause banks are able to borrow loans via the interbank market to deal with their
liquidity shortage issue. This results in the increase in the number of surviving
banks as connectivity increases and supports the finding in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2: Number of surviving banks in the homogeneous case at different level of connec-
tivity with M = 400, N = 100, T = 500, σD = 0.5, σS = 0, σO = 0 and σω = 0
The result presented in Figure 4.2 is the simplest scenario with only one
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fluctuation, that is, the change in customers’ deposit and withdrawal patterns.
Therefore, it can be viewed as a benchmark case and can be used as comparison
with other more complicated scenarios. Obviously, the benchmark case in which
all banks are homogeneous is unrealistic. Next, I introduce a couple of heteroge-
neous factors into the simulations. I first present the role of connectivity under
each heterogeneous case. Then I study the magnitude of the effect each of these
factors has on the number of surviving banks.
The effect of connectivity C on three heterogeneous cases
In the first heterogeneous case, banks differ in their bank sizes. The average bank
size remains unchanged, that is, S¯ = 1000. However, the size of bank k is given
by Sk = |S¯ + σSυ| where σS = 500. In the second heterogeneous case, banks
differ in their average investment opportunity. Therefore, the size of bank k is
still Sk = 1000 but its average investment opportunity is O¯k = δ|Sk + σOν| with
σO = 500. In the third heterogeneous case, each bank faces fluctuation in its
maximum investment opportunity in each period. Therefore, since σO = 0, its
average investment opportunity is O¯k = δ × Sk = 500, but its maximum invest-
ment opportunity at any time t is given by ωkt = |O¯k + O¯kσωηt where σω = 0.5.
Table 4.1 displays the values of different parameters in different cases for simula-
tions.
Table 4.1: Summary of the values for different parameters for the homogeneous case and the
three heterogeneous cases
Case σD σS σO σω
Homogeneous 0.5 0 0 0
Heterogeneous in initial bank size 0.5 500 0 0
Heterogeneous in average investment opportunity 0.5 0 500 0
Heterogeneous in maximum investment opportunity over time 0.5 0 0 0.5
Figure 4.3, Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 show the number of surviving banks at
different level of connectivity under the three heterogeneous cases respectively.
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Regarding the role of connectivity, the three cases produce qualitatively simi-
lar results, in the sense that as the level of connectivity increases, the number of
bank default reduces. This is consistent with the homogeneous case. This suggest
that, under the construction of the current model, in which banks are randomly
connected to each others, an increase in the connections between banks within
the system does strengthen the stability of the system by reducing the number
of bank defaults, regardless of the heterogeneity. This relationship is monotonic.
Table 4.2: Banks’ activities on investment and interbank transactions for the homogeneous
case with different level of connectivity
Connectivity
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
Average percentage of investment
opportunity fulfilled per period
64.8 64.3 65.0 66.6 65.3 64.7
Average number of interbank
transaction per period
0 16.53 36.83 57.08 75.77 92.72
Average volume of interbank
transaction per period
0 460.4 1110.2 1822.2 2517.8 3242.8
Although Figure 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 all come to the same conclusion with respect
to the role of connectivity, the curve at c = 0 in Figure 4.4 differs from the other
two heterogeneous cases or even the homogeneous case. The curve flattens at
around 30 banks and is very unlikely to fall below that value regardless of how-
ever many periods the simulations are run for. This can be explained because of
the nature of the heterogeneity. Since banks differ in their average investment
opportunity, O¯k = δ|Sk + σOν|, at σO = 500, there exists some banks that have
a low average investment opportunity. At each period, these banks have a low
maximum investment opportunity and as a result, they always have plenty of
liquid resources in the bank, on top of their reserve requirement. This feature
makes these banks extremely resistant to the fluctuation in the change in deposit
and withdrawals patterns. In other words, even in the extreme case where there
is a big drop in net deposit, these banks are very unlikely to end up with negative
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liquidity, and since C = 0, these banks are not connected to other banks and are
not allow to lend out interbank loans, therefore, they do not face the risk of not
being able to recover their loans. In the current setting, there do not exist any
channels to cause these banks to default and hence they survive continuously and
produce the horizontal curve in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.3: Number of surviving banks in the heterogeneous case in initial bank size across
banks at different level of connectivity with M = 400, N = 100, T = 500, σD = 0.5, σS = 500,
σO = 0 and σω = 0
Table 4.3 , 4.4 and 4.5 show the banks’ activities on investment and interbank
transactions for the three heterogeneous cases respectively. A closer look at Ta-
ble 4.3 shows that the all of the results are both qualitatively and quantitatively
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Table 4.3: Banks’ activities on investment and interbank transactions for the heterogeneous
case in initial bank size with different level of connectivity
Connectivity
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
Average percentage of investment
opportunity fulfilled per period
65.1 64.9 65.1 65.2 65.3 65.5
Average number of interbank
transactions per period
0 15.63 33.92 52.99 71.12 87.34
Average volume of interbank
transactions per period
0 376.8 874.9 1507.1 2100.1 3242.8
Figure 4.4: Number of surviving banks in the heterogeneous case in average investment
opportunity across banks at different level of connectivity with M = 400, N = 100, T = 500,
σD = 0.5, σS = 0, σO = 500 and σω = 0
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Table 4.4: Banks’ activities on investment and interbank transactions for the heterogeneous
case in average investment opportunity with different level of connectivity
Connectivity
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
Average percentage of investment
opportunity fulfilled per period
61.6 61.4 59.2 58.8 58.7 58.6
Average number of interbank
transactions per period
0 94.90 139.63 156.46 163.90 166.72
Average volume of interbank
transactions per period
0 3861.2 5803.2 6574.15 6931.8 7064.5
Figure 4.5: Number of surviving banks in the heterogeneous case in a bank’s maximum
investment opportunity over time at different level of connectivity with M = 400, N = 100,
T = 500, σD = 0.5, σS = 0, σO = 0 and σω = 0.5
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Table 4.5: Banks’ activities on investment and interbank transactions for the heterogeneous
case in maximum investment opportunity over time with different level of connectivity
Connectivity
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
Average percentage of investment
opportunity fulfilled per period
59.6 59.6 59.8 59.7 59.8 59.8
Average number of interbank
transactions per period
0 69.71 117.62 136.31 140.70 143.26
Average volume of interbank
transactions per period
0 2666.7 4674.6 5503.41 5702.96 5826.48
similar to results in Table 4.2. It shows that the average percentage of invest op-
portunity fulfilled is around 64% - 66% and both the average number of interbank
transactions and their average volume increase as the connectivity increases. In
table4.4, it can be seen that there is a slight down in average percentage of in-
vestment opportunity fulfilled per period for the second heterogeneous case with
61.6% in comparison with the homogeneous case. This is because when invest-
ment opportunity is not evenly distributed across banks, there exist some banks
that have excess liquid reserve with low investment opportunity and others that
have limited liquid reserve with investment opportunity unfulfilled. Therefore,
the aggregate average investment opportunity fulfilled is lower. The table also
shows that the percentage decreases as connectivity increases. This is because as
banks are connected to many counterparties, there is a higher chance that they
are involved in interbank activities. However, if the counterparties are unable to
repay the loans in the next period, this has a impact on the ability and amount
of investment opportunity the creditor bank can fulfil and this results in the de-
crease in the average aggregate percentage achieved. The number of interbank
transactions and their average volume size are quantitatively the same as the
previous two cases, in the sense that, as connectivity increases, both the number
and the volume of interbank transaction increase. However the magnitude for
both of these are a lot higher. The possible explanation is that those banks with
high investment opportunity are likely to invest as much of as excess liquidity as
possible. Unfortunately, due to the maturity of the investment, those investment
resources become illiquid. Therefore, this results in them having a higher risk
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from liquidity shortage when their customers’ withdraw their deposits. In turn,
this results in them seeking for loans in the interbank market. The fact that there
are banks that have low investment opportunity and have plenty surplus liquidity,
these requests from the potential borrowing banks are highly likely to be fulfilled.
This results in the high number and volume of interbank transactions. Lastly,
the findings from Table 4.5 is quantitatively similar to Table 4.4 and the high
number and volume of interbank transactions are also due to the heterogeneity
in investment opportunity for banks.
After considering the role of connectivity in the homogeneous case and the
three heterogeneous cases, I now move onto studying the three heterogeneous
factors individually.
4.3.2 The effect of heterogeneity
Heterogeneity in initial bank size
Previously in Figure 4.3, it shows the number of surviving banks at different level
of connectivity assuming that σS = 500. In order to investigate the effect of
the heterogeneity in initial bank size on the bank system, I study the number of
surviving banks at different level of σS. In Figure 4.6, the value for σS changes
from 0 to 500 at every 100 interval and the level of connectivity is assumed to be
C = 0.02. Since in Figure 4.3, when C = 0.02, all 400 banks default by about 170
periods, therefore, I only present 100 period in Figure 4.6. It shows that as the
value for σS increases, the number of surviving banks decreases, even though the
difference is small for every change in σS in 100 interval. This suggest, although
weakly, that if banks are of different sizes, the system is less stable. This finding
is supported by Table 4.6, which shows the banks’ activities on investment and
interbank transactions. The table illustrates both the the average number and
volume of interbank transactions decrease, again though weakly, as σS increases.
The explanation is as follows: when σS = 0, that is when banks are homogeneous
in terms of initial bank size, their average liquidity need should be more or less
the same. However, as σS increases, the the initial bank sizes begin to differ
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and so do the customers’ deposit and and investment opportunity. Therefore,
when these ’bigger’ banks suffer a liquidity shortage arising from their customers’
withdrawal, the magnitude of the liquidity shortage is bigger and this reduces
the chances for them to be able to borrow enough interbank loans to cover their
needs. Therefore, the interbank activities decreases, as shown in Table 4.6, which
in turns explains the slight increase in the number of defaults in banks for higher
value ofσS.
Figure 4.6: Number of surviving banks in the heterogeneous case in initial bank size at
different values of σS with M = 400, C = 0.02, N = 100, T = 500, σD = 0.5, σO = 0 and
σω = 0
Heterogeneity in average investment opportunity
Similarly, I next consider the effect of the heterogeneity in average investment
opportunity on the bank system. In a similar manner, I choose C = 0.02 and
study the number of surviving banks at different level of σO. Since the change
in values for σO does seem to produce a larger effect on the number of surviving
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Table 4.6: Banks’ activities on investment and interbank transactions for the heterogeneous
case in initial bank size with different value of σS
σS
0 100 200 300 400 500
Average percentage of investment
opportunity fulfilled per period
65.1 65.1 65.1 65.1 65.1 65.1
Average number of interbank
transactions per period
36.83 36.57 35.78 35.47 34.94 33.92
Average volume of interbank
transactions per period
1100.2 1090.37 1031.33 992.2 940.6 874.9
banks, therefore I present the results for 500 periods in Figure 4.7. It shows that
by increasing the heterogeneity in average investment opportunity across banks,
that is as σO change from 0 to 500, the number of surviving banks increases dra-
matically. A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that some banks have
a low average investment opportunity and always have surplus liquid resources
in their holdings. This not only equip them well against fluctuation in deposit
and withdrawal patterns, but it also allows them to have excess liquidity to offer
to banks that suffer from negative liquidity. Therefore this reduces number of
bank defaults in two ways. This explanation is supported by the evidence in Ta-
ble 4.7. The fact that some banks have plenty of surplus liquid resources due to
low investment opportunity available to them means that they can be potential
interbank lenders. Table 4.7 shows that the average number and volume of inter-
bank transactions increase substantially as σO increases. As a result, it is highly
likely that most banks with liquidity shortage are able to borrow loans through
the interbank market and hence, this increases the stability of the system and
increases the number of surviving banks.
Heterogeneity in maximum investment opportunity over time
Finally, I consider the effect of heterogeneity in maximum investment opportu-
nity over time. Again, similar to the simulations for the other two heterogeneous
cases, I choose C = 0.02 and look at the number of surviving banks at different
60
4.3 Preliminary results
Figure 4.7: Number of surviving banks in the heterogeneous case in average investment
opportunity across banks at different values of σO with M = 400, C = 0.02, N = 100, T = 500,
σD = 0.5, σS = 0 and σω = 0
Table 4.7: Banks’ activities on investment and interbank transactions for the heterogeneous
case in initial bank size with different value of σO
σO
0 100 200 300 400 500
Average percentage of investment
opportunity fulfilled per period
65.1 66.0 66.7 65.4 62.5 59.4
Average number of interbank
transactions per period
36.83 39.88 63.95 98.59 123.73 139.63
Average volume of interbank
transactions per period
1100.2 1228.61 2245.5 3824.6 5034.8 5803.2
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level of σω. So far, as shown in Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7, the relationship between
the change in either σS or σO against the number of surviving banks is mono-
tonic, though it is monotonically decreasing for σS and monotonically increasing
for σO. However, Figure 4.8 shows that as σω changes from 0 to 0.6, the num-
ber of surviving banks increases and from 0.8 onwards, the number of surviving
banks actually decreases and at σω = 1, the number of surviving banks is even
less than when σω = 0. This suggests that, under different conditions, there is an
optimal value for σω for the system to achieve a slightly more stable environment.
Figure 4.8: Number of surviving banks in the heterogeneous case in a bank’s maximum
investment opportunity over time at different values of σω with M = 400, c = 0.02, N = 100,
T = 500, σD = 0.5, σS = 0 and σO = 0
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Table 4.8: Banks’ activities on investment and interbank transactions for the heterogeneous
case in initial bank size with different value of σω
σω
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Average percentage of investment
opportunity fulfilled per period
65.1 63.9 61.7 56.9 50.4 44.7
Average number of interbank
transactions per period
36.83 41.94 83.87 143.39 168.33 173.58
Average volume of interbank
transactions per period
1100.2 1423.8 3210.0 5800.25 6924.4 7209.2
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter first presents the problem experienced in implementing Iori, Jafarey,
and Padilla (2006)’s model. It then proposes some corrections and modifications
towards the model and discusses some of the preliminary findings.
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Chapter 5
A Comprehensive Interbank
Market Model
5.1 Introduction
The implementation of Iori, Jafarey, and Padilla (2006) model in Chapter 3 to-
gether with some modifications in Chapter 4 form the basis of bank daily oper-
ations and the usage of interbank transactions. However, in Iori, Jafarey, and
Padilla (2006), the authors consider a banking system in which banks are ran-
domly connected to each other based on a connectivity parameter C. A number
of empirical studies on the interbank market for different countries show that
the actual structure of these interbank markets are not random. Some of them
show that the real-world interbank markets are best represented by a scale-free
network, see Blavarg and Nimander (2002) and van Lelyveld and Liedorp (2006).
Others find that some interbank markets exhibit a star structure or the core-
peripheral structure, see Iori, De-Masi, Precup, Gabbi, and Caldarelli (2008) and
Wells (2002). Therefore, this section provides a full description of an interbank
market model with a star structure.
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5.2 Description of the complete model
5.2.1 Construction of a banking system
Network structure
In order to construct a star structure of banks transacting in the interbank mar-
ket, I revise the construction of the banking system as follows. Let’s consider a
system of M banks, in which there is one large bank in the centre and M − 1
small peripheral banks. As before, relationships between these M banks are also
presented in a connectivity matrix, Jij for i = 1, 2, ...,M and j = 1, 2, ...,M . Each
element in this connectivity matrix can only take one of the two values, 0 or 1 and
the value it takes is used to define whether the two banks are connected to each
other. Jij = 1 indicates that bank i and bank j are in connection and interbank
transactions can be arranged between themselves while Jij = 0 represents that
bank i and bank j are not linked to each other and hence they cannot arrange
interbank transactions.
It is assumed that ‘relationship’ is non-directional, therefore, if two banks
are connected, then both parties can be a borrower or a lender in an interbank
transaction. A bank cannot arrange interbank transaction with itself, therefore,
Jij = 0 if i = j.
At the very beginning of each simulation, the values for the connectivity ma-
trix Jij ∀i 6= j are generated. It is assumed that all the small banks are connected
to the large bank in the centre. The parameter connectivity C is used to determine
whether each of the small banks is connected among each other. For the purpose
of simulations, a random number will be drawn for each pair of small-and-small
bank i and j. If the random number is less than or equal to C, then bank i
and j are connected. On the contrary, if the random number drawn exceeds C,
then bank i and j are not connected. Therefore, each simulation generates one
realisation of a banking system.
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The above description has been adopted from Iori, Jafarey, and Padilla (2006)
model and will only be used in the extended case. For the time being, a core-
peripheral network structure will be studied in which there is only one core bank
in the middle with many small banks on the peripheral. Therefore, it is assumed
that every single small banks are connected to the large core bank in the middle,
as well as among themselves. As a result, the parameter C will be omitted.
Bank size, size of deposit and size of investment opportunity
The size of any bank k is denoted by Sk and it is given by
Sk =
{
S¯ if k = 1
1
M−1 × S¯ if k 6= 1
(5.1)
where S¯ is size of the large bank. For the moment, it is assumed that the ag-
gregate bank size is split into two equal halves: one-half is allocated to the large
bank and the other half is shared among the small banks. Therefore, the aggre-
gate bank size of the system is 2S¯.
It is assumed that banks differ in terms of the level of deposit they receive
and the investment opportunity they have. Previously, in the implementation of
the Iori, Jafarey, and Padilla (2006) model, it has always been assumed that a
bank’s investment opportunity is δ times the bank size, in which the bank size
equals to the average size of deposit. However, it would be more appropriate to
model them in a closer resemblance to the real-world data. Firstly, large banks
generally have more investment than their available liquidity while small banks
are often better at receiving customers’ deposit. Secondly, Cocco, Gomes, and
Martins (2009) studying the lending relationships in the interbank market show
that large banks are usually the net interbank borrowers while the small banks
are net lenders. They also show that large banks usually borrow from the small
ones. Therefore, in order for a banking system to exhibit more coherence to
the reality, there should be more investment opportunity available to the large
banks and the small banks should in general have excess liquidity available to
lend out in the interbank market. More specifically, it will be assumed that the
large banks have a size of investment opportunity that is more than δ times its
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average size of deposit while small banks have an investment opportunity size
that is less than δ times its average deposit size. For the sake of comparison, the
aggregate deposit size and investment opportunity are kept unchanged. To do so,
a parameter, IMk, is created to model this imbalance between the size of deposit
and the investment opportunity for any bank k.
IMk =
{
−κ× (δSk) if k = 1
κ× (δSk) if k 6= 1 (5.2)
where κ is the imbalance parameter with κ ≥ 0, δ is the aggregate investment
opportunity : aggregate bank size ratio. As mentioned above, the aggregate bank
size is 2S¯. Therefore, the aggregate investment opportunity in the whole system
is 2δS¯. If imbalance does not exist, that is, banks are all homogeneous in their
investment opportunity : deposit ratio, then a bank’s investment opportunity is
simply δ times its bank size.
Once the imbalance between the size of deposit and the investment opportu-
nity is generated, then the size of bank k’s average deposit is denoted by D¯k
D¯k = Sk +
IMk
2
(5.3)
This average deposit size, D¯k, represents, over a long period of time, the average
amount of deposits bank k receives from its customers. Similarly, the size of bank
k’s average investment opportunity is denoted by O¯k
O¯k = δSk − IM
k
2
(5.4)
The banks’ sizes, their average deposit sizes and their average investment op-
portunity sizes are generated before the initial period. The intuition of (5.2),
(5.3) and (5.4) is to create a large bank in the centre with higher investment op-
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portunity than its available liquidity and vice versa for the small peripheral banks.
Balance sheet of a bank
A balance sheet is a financial statement of a financial institution or organisation.
It consists of the assets side and the liabilities side. Table 5.1 illustrates an ex-
ample of a simplified version of balance sheet for a bank.
Assets Side Liabilities Side
Liquidity (Cash and Reserve) Equity
Investment Deposit
Interbank lending Interbank borrowing
Total assets Total liabilities and equity
Table 5.1: An example of a simplified version of stylised balance sheet for a bank
The term ‘total assets’ includes everything that the bank owns whereas ‘total
liabilities’ consists of all the debts of the banks. ‘Equity’ refers to the capital of
the bank. In finance or accounting, since the assets side and the liabilities side
must be equal, therefore, equity is given as the total assets net total liabilities.
5.2.2 Model operation
The model operates in discrete time, which is denoted by t = 0, 1, 2, ..., T where
T + 1 denotes the number of periods in each simulation.
Receipt or withdrawal of deposits
At each period t, each bank k faces new deposits and withdrawals from its cus-
tomers. The total amount of deposits net withdrawals is given by Dkt . This
amount changes everyday and its fluctuation is modelled by the following pro-
cess, and is given by
Dkt =
{
|D¯k × (1− αL) + αL ×Dkt−1 + D¯k × σDt| if k = 1
|D¯k × (1− αS) + αS ×Dkt−1 + D¯k × σDt| if k 6= 1
(5.5)
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where αL and αS are the parameters of the process and 0 < αL < 1 and
0 < αS < 1. σD denotes the standard deviation in the fluctuation in deposits
and t ∼ N(0, 1). This new process has been adopted to model the fluctuation
in deposit. This is because the one previously used in the implementation of
Iori, Jafarey, and Padilla (2006) is completely random, meaning that the deposit
from one day to another can move from extreme high to extreme low or vice
versa. Although this is not impossible, the random process makes this kind of
change in deposit very frequently and without economical explanation. Besides,
the frequent big fluctuation in deposit modelled in the previous random process
also led to an unrealistic use of the interbank market for liquidity shortage. This
affects the analysis on the usage of interbank market. The new process models
the deposit to be dependent on the previously period, yet with a random fluctua-
tion. This is a more realistic fluctuation in deposit with respect to the real-world
phenomenon and leads to a more realistic and appropriate use of the interbank
market. The interest rate for deposits is assumed to be fixed over time and across
banks and it is denoted by rD. Therefore, if bank k received a deposit of D
k
t−1 at
t− 1, it has to pay out a total interest of rDDkt−1 at t to its customers, regardless
of withdrawal.
Receipt of investment income and matured investment
If a bank made an investment in any of the last τ periods, it receives an income
from its investment. This income is assumed to be a fixed proportion of its in-
vestment. This fixed proportion is denoted by rI and is assumed to be constant
over time and across banks. Therefore, at any time t, bank k receives an income
of rI
τ∑
s=1
Ikt−s from all its outstanding investments.
Previously, it has been assumed that investment is risk-free. In other words,
when an investment matures, a bank always receive the full amount of the capital
it invest. However, it is more realistic to incorporate risky assets into the model.
When an investment, Ikt−τ reaches it maturity, the bank faces an uncertainty that
it may not be able to receive all of the capital invested. Let Z represents the
loss function in which Z ∈ [0, 1] and Z has a distribution of 1− exp(−λx). Then
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at any time t, when an investment matures, the amount of capital that a bank
would receive will be given as
Iˆkt−τ = [1− Z]× Ikt−τ (5.6)
In order to generate values for Z, I will use the following theorem.
Theorem. Let U ∼ U(0, 1) and F be a continuous and strictly increasing cumu-
lative distribution function, then F−1(U) is a sample of F .
The above theorem is referred to as the inverse transform sampling method.
More information can be found in Devroye (1986). The method allows the trans-
formation of results from the uniform distribution to the distribution F . Let
F = 1 − exp(−λx), then Z = F−1(U) will have the distribution F where
U ∼ U(0, 1). However, since F ∈ [0,∞) while Z ∈ [0, 1], therefore only part
of the uniform distribution will be considered.
F (x) = 1− exp(−λx)
y = 1− exp(−λx)
exp(−λx) = 1− y
−λx = ln(1− y)
x = − ln(1− y)
λ
F−1(y) = − ln(1− y)
λ
Therefore the inverse function of F is F−1(U) = − ln(1−U)
λ
. If U ∼ U(0, 1),
then F ∈ [0,∞), which means that Z ∈ [0,∞). By considering U ∼ U(0, F (1)),
then Z ∈ [0, 1]. The algorithm is given below.
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Algorithm 1 Inversion of the distribution function
1. Generate U ∼ U(0, F (1))
2. Z = F−1(U)
Output: Z has the distribution of F and Z ∈ [0, 1]
After the receipt of new deposits and withdrawals, together with investment
income and the capital of the risky matured investment, the liquidity of bank k
is given by
Lˆkt = L
k
t−1 + (D
k
t −Dkt−1)− rDDkt−1 + rI
τ∑
s=1
Ikt−s + Iˆ
k
t−τ (5.7)
and the equity of bank k is given by
Eˆkt = Lˆ
k
t +
τ−1∑
s=0
Ikt−s + IL
k
t−1 −Dkt − IBkt−1 (5.8)
where ILkt−1 and IB
k
t−1 are respectively the interbank lending and interbank bor-
rowing of bank k at period t− 1.
Repayment of interbank loans
When banks close at the end of the day, their first priority is to repay their in-
terbank loans in full if there are any. If they are unable to repay their debt in
full, it is assumed that those banks do not repay for the time being, but instead
they issue debt certificates to their creditors. These debt certificates are to be
redeemed before the beginning of the next period and they should still reflect in
the banks’ liquidity.
The repayment procedure is as follows. At any time t, if a bank k borrowed
interbank loans in the period t− 1, then its total interbank borrowing is greater
than zero, that is IBkt−1 > 0 and the amount it has to repay to its creditor(s) is
(1 + rB)IB
k
t−1, where rB is the interbank interest rate. If bank k’s liquid cash
holding is greater than the amount it should repay, that is Lˆkt ≥ (1 + rB)IBkt−1,
then it is assumed that it does. The balance sheets of bank k and its creditor(s)
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should be updated. The items to be updated on the balance sheet for bank k are
L˘kt = Lˆ
k
t − (1 + rB)IBkt−1
IBkt−1 = 0
and for bank j, assuming that it previously lent interbank loans to bank k, are
L˘jt = Lˆ
j
t + (1 + rB)IT
kj
t−1
IT kjt−1 = 0
IT jkt−1 = 0
where IT kjt−1 denotes the actual interbank transaction between bank k and j. A
positive value of IT kjt−1 represents that bank k borrowed interbank loans from bank
j in the previous period and in such a case, the value of IT jkt−1 must be of the
same magnitude but opposite sign. Although a bank can be both an interbank
borrower or lender, it can only be either one of the two in any particular period.
This means that, for a bank k, the values of all IT kjt ∀j 6= k should take the
same sign at any time t.
M∑
j=1
IT kjt =
{
IBkt if k borrows
−ILkt if k lends
(5.9)
IBkt ≥ 0 and ILkt ≥ 0 for ∀k.
However, if bank k’s liquid cash holding is less than the amount it needs to re-
pay its creditor(s), that is Lˆkt < (1 + rB)IB
k
t−1, then it issues debt certificate
of size (1 + rB)IT
kj
t−1 to each of its creditor j. All these debt certificates should
be reflected on the liquidity of bank k and therefore it is L˘kt = Lˆ
k
t −(1+rB)IBkt−1.
Upon the repayment cycle, regardless of whether a creditor bank manages to
receive its interbank loans it previously lent to others, the equity of any bank k
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is
E˘kt = L˘
k
t +
τ−1∑
s=0
Ikt−s + IL
k
t −Dkt − IBkt (5.10)
Regulatory requirement for liquidity
After the repayment of interbank loans, banks pay dividend and make new invest-
ment, provided that they satisfy a number of regulatory requirements. Therefore,
before providing the description of the procedure for dividend payment and in-
vestment, I introduce these regulatory requirements. In this model, there are in
total three regulatory requirements that each bank has to satisfy. The first one,
which is associated with the liquidity aspect of the bank, is called the reserve
requirement. The second and third one, which are both related to the equity
issue of the bank, are named the equity requirement and the capital adequacy
requirement respectively.
Liquidity can be understood as cash and it is classified as liquid resource
because it is instantaneously available upon request. If this liquid resource is not
being made good use of, then it does not bring any benefit or profit to the bank.
Therefore, a bank will later make investment based on its available liquidity and
aim to earn profits. However, resource assigned as investment is classified as
illiquid. At any time t, a bank’s reserve requirement is calculated as a proportion
of its current deposits from customers and the amount of reserve, Rkt is given as
Rkt = β ×Dkt (5.11)
where β is the reserve ratio. The objective of this regulatory requirement is to
make sure that a bank maintains a certain level of liquid resource, namely the
reserve, within itself, and this reserve can be used against unforeseen circum-
stances, for example, a big customers’ withdrawal in the next period. Therefore,
at any particular period, if a bank is unable to satisfy its reserve requirement, it
means that the bank is not allowed to commit to activities like dividend payment,
making investment or lending out interbank loans to other banks. However, the
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bank itself should not be penalised in any ways for not reaching the required
reserve level. All it means is that this bank is slightly more at risk to suffer from
liquidity shortage if a big withdrawal from customers take place in the next period.
Regulatory requirements for equity
The equity requirement is given by
Eqkt = E˘
k
t /S
k (5.12)
This requirement only comes into the picture when a bank wants to pay out divi-
dend and that Eqkt must be greater than or equal to the equity requirement ratio,
χ. It will later be shown that the value used to determine the amount of equity
each bank starts with at the very beginning of time equals to χ. In the current
setting, a bank’s equity is affected in one of the following five ways: it increases
if a bank receives investment income; it increases (decreases) if the bank receives
(pays out) interest on its interbank loans; it decreases when the bank pays out
interest to its depositors; it suffers a loss if the bank doesn’t receive the matured
investment in full (arising from the fact that investment is not risk-free); and it
decreases if the bank was an interbank lender but it is not able to receive the
loans from its borrower(s). Therefore, the objective of the requirement is to check
whether the bank has an overall gain or loss in equity in any particular period.
If there is a net gain, meaning that the bank has an excess in equity compared
to its original equity size, then the bank can consider paying out dividend to its
shareholders. The amount of dividend to be paid out will be given later.
The capital adequacy requirement is considered when a bank wants to make
new investment or lend interbank loans to other banks. It is given by
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Capkt =
Capital
Risk weighted assets
=
E˘kt
ρLL˘kt + ρI
τ−1∑
s=0
Ikt−s + ρILIL
k
t
where ρL, ρI and ρIL are the weighted-risk of cash, investment and interbank lend-
ing respectively. Since there is no risk in holding cash, therefore the weighted-risk
for cash should be zero and the capital adequacy requirement can be simplified
to
Capkt =
E˘kt
ρI
τ−1∑
s=0
Ikt−s + ρILIL
k
t
(5.13)
Therefore, before bank k can make further investment or lend interbank loans to
others, it must be able to first satisfy the capital adequacy requirement, that is,
Capkt must exceed the capital adequacy requirement ratio φ.
Dividend payment and new investment
Dividends are paid out to shareholders when a bank makes profits. Bank k
can only pay out dividend if it satisfies the equity requirement. And when it
does, the actual dividend payment is the minimum value between the profit it
makes, its available cash (that is, liquidity net reserve) and its excess equity.
Mathematically, it is given by
Divkt = max{0,min[rI
τ∑
s=1
Ikt−s+rB(IL
k
t−1−IBkt−1)−rDDkt−1, L˘kt −Rkt , E˘kt −χSk]}
(5.14)
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However, if it does not meet the regulatory requirements, it does not pay out
any dividend. Therefore, if Eqkt ≤ χ, then Divkt = 0. After making dividend
payment, the liquidity and equity of a bank get updated and they respectively
are
L`kt = L˘
k
t −Divkt (5.15)
E`kt = L`
k
t +
τ−1∑
s=0
Ikt−s + IL
k
t −Dkt − IBkt (5.16)
Then, banks can consider investing in fresh investment projects. The aver-
age investment opportunity for each bank is generated at the beginning of the
simulation and is given in equation (5.4). In each period t, the actual maximum
investment opportunity, ωkt , available to each bank k fluctuates at its average
investment opportunity and it is given by
ωkt = |O¯k + σωO¯kηt| (5.17)
where σω is the standard deviation of the fluctuation and η ∼ N(0, 1). In order to
focus on the use of the interbank market as a result of liquidity shortage arising
from the fluctuation of deposits, the fluctuation in the maximum investment
opportunity for banks at each period will be assumed to be zero. Undertaking
new investment is a beneficial way for a bank to make profit. Ideally, a bank would
invest up to its maximum investment opportunity. However, investment does not
mature until τ period later and hence when resources are used for investment,
they are classified as illiquid. For this reason, a bank must not use its reserve
for investment. Therefore, bank k will undertake new investment based on its
maximum investment opportunity and its available liquidity (cash), provided that
this will not violate the capital adequacy requirement. Hence, at this stage, the
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amount of investment bank k can make is
Ikt = min[max(0, L`
k
t −Rkt ), ωkt ,
E`kt − φ(ρI
τ−1∑
s=0
Ikt−s + ρILIL
k
t )
φρI
] (5.18)
The derivation of the third term is shown below. Before a bank makes new
investment, its Capkt >= φ. Let ∆I be the amount of investment a bank plans
to make.
φ ≤ E`
k
t
ρI(
τ−1∑
s=0
Ikt−s + ∆I) + ρILIL
k
t
E`kt ≥ φ[ρI(
τ−1∑
s=0
Ikt−s + ∆I) + ρILIL
k
t ]
φρI∆I ≤ E`kt − φ(ρI
τ−1∑
s=0
Ikt−s + ρILIL
k
t )
∆I ≤
E`kt − φ(ρI
τ−1∑
s=0
Ikt−s + ρILIL
k
t )
φρI
Therefore, the amount of new investment that a bank can commit to must be
smaller than or equal to the term on the right hand side of the above inequality.
After the dividend is paid and new investment is made, it comes to the end of
the period t. The liquidity and equity of bank k after dividend and investment
are given respectively as
L´kt = L`
k
t − Ikt (5.19)
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E´kt = L´
k
t +
τ−1∑
s=0
Ikt−s + IL
k
t −Dkt − IBkt (5.20)
Arrangement of interbank transactions for liquidity shortage
A bank that has a negative liquidity is said to be in liquidity shortage. The
changes in liquidity depend on the fluctuation in deposits and withdrawals from
customers, the successfulness of investment maturing at its full value and the suc-
cessfulness of receiving (paying) interbank loans from (to) its debtors (creditors).
At this stage, banks can be grouped into three different categories: banks that
paid out dividend and made new investment and have no excess liquidity above its
reserve will do nothing; banks that have excess liquidity can be potential lenders
in the interbank market; and banks that have liquidity shortage will attempt to
approach their connected banks and arrange to borrow interbank loans. For sim-
ulation purpose, it is assumed that a bank k that has liquidity shortage is chosen
randomly. This bank k then approaches its connected banks j one by one, again
in a random manner, and try to arrange an interbank borrowing. The maximum
amount that bank k can borrow from bank j depends on its liquidity need (|L´kt |),
its creditor’s available liquidity (L´jt−Rjt ) and the creditor’s excess equity to cover
the additional liabilities it is about to commit to. Mathematically, it is given as
I˜T
kj
t = min[|L´kt |, L´jt −Rjt ,
E´jt − φ(ρI
τ−1∑
s=0
Ijt−s + ρILIL
j
t)
φρIL
] (5.21)
A similar derivation for the third term is illustrated below.
In order for a bank j to lend out interbank loans, its Capjt >= φ. Let ∆IL
be the amount of interbank loan bank j is willing to lend out.
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φ ≤ E´
j
t
ρI
τ−1∑
s=0
Ijt−s + ρIL(IL
j
t + ∆IL)
E´jt ≥ φ[ρI
τ−1∑
s=0
Ijt−s + ρIL(IL
j
t + ∆IL)]
φρIL∆IL ≤ E´jt − φ(ρI
τ−1∑
s=0
Ijt−s + ρILIL
j
t)
∆IL ≤
E´jt − φ(ρI
τ−1∑
s=0
Ijt−s + ρILIL
j
t)
φρIL
Similarly, the amount of interbank lending that a bank can commit to must
be less than or equal to the term on the right hand side of the above inequal-
ity. Unless the amount of I˜T
kj
t is exactly the same as bank k’s liquidity need,
otherwise, the interbank transaction is only pending. Interbank loans will only
be transacted if the bank with liquidity shortage can line up enough loans from
its creditor(s) to avoid having a net negative liquidity. Therefore, the bank is
assumed to continue approaching its connected banks for more interbank loans
until either it arranges enough interbank borrowings to cover its liquidity short-
age or there are no longer any other banks that are willing to lend to it. If it is
the former case, then those interbank loans are transacted, whereas if it is the
latter case, then the bank fails to arrange enough interbank loans to cover its liq-
uidity shortage and hence it defaults. When banks proceed with their interbank
transactions, the balance sheets of borrowing bank k and lending bank(s) j are
updated.
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L˜kt = L´
k
t + I˜T
kj
t
˜IB
k
t =
M∑
j=1
I˜T
kj
t
L˜jt = L´
j
t − I˜T
kj
t
I˜L
j
t =
M∑
k=1
I˜T
kj
t
For banks that manage to borrow interbank loans in this period, if their
liquidity shortage arose as a result of change in deposit or a loss in the matured
risky asset, then they don’t have to do anything. However, if the liquidity shortage
was due to the failure of repaying interbank loans for the previous period and
issued debt certificate(s) to its creditor(s), then it can redeem the certificate now.
Therefore, the balance sheet(s) of its creditor(s) i from the previous period get
updated.
L˜it = L´
i
t + (1 + rB)IT
ki
t−1
Extension of loans
The option of extending the interbank loans will be incorporated into the model
after which banks attempted to repay their interbank borrowings in full if possi-
ble. For implementation purpose, the extension of loans should come before the
‘regulatory requirements for equity’ paragraph. The procedure is as follows: if
bank k borrowed an interbank loans from bank j in the period t− 1 and if bank
k is unable to repay the loans at t, then bank k can attempt to request to extend
the loan with bank j. It is assumed that bank k will only request to extend part
of the loan such that it no longer has negative liquidity. Therefore, if bank k is
able to pay the interest on the interbank loans, it is assumed that it will do so
and it will only request to extend the loan itself. Only if bank k is unable to pay
off the interest to its credit bank, then it will request to extend the loan with
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interest. For the creditor bank’s perspective, the incorporation of loan extension
makes sense too. This is because when its debtor banks fail to repay the inter-
bank loans, the creditor bank will suffer both liquidity and equity problem. If the
effect is serious, the creditor bank may result in negative liquidity or equity and
will go bankrupt itself. Therefore, this does motivate creditor banks’ willingness
to extend their interbank loans to its debtors. It is assumed that debtor banks
are allowed to extend their loans indefinitely provided that the creditor banks
are agreed to. The interbank transaction is given by the minimum between what
bank k has previously borrowed from bank j and the amount it needs in order
not to have negative liquidity.
I¨T
kj
t = min(IT
kj
t−1,max(0, R
k
t − L´kt )) (5.22)
Initialisation of simulations
In order to initialise each simulation, a couple of parameters will have to be chosen
exogenously. It is assumed that the deposit of each bank k at t = −1 to be its
average deposit size; it follows that its reserve at t = −1 will be β multiply by its
previous deposit size; the equity will be χ multiply by the bank size. It is also
assumed that there were no interbank transactions between all banks at all in the
period t = −1. Finally, it is assumed that banks have invested as much as they
could in the last τ periods and that the amount is evenly spread among the last
τ periods.
Dk−1 = D¯
k
Ek−1 = χS
k
Rk−1 = βD
k
−1 = βD¯
k
IBk−1 = 0
ILk−1 = 0
Ik−s = min[O¯
k,
χSk + (1− β)D¯k
τ
,
Ek−1
ψρIτ
]
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for k = 1, 2, ...,M and s = 1, 2, ..., τ .
The derivation of what values each of the Ik−s is provided below. Since the
liquidity of a bank k at the end of the period t = −1 is given by
Lk−1 = E
k
−1 +D
k
−1 + IB
k
−1 −
τ∑
s=1
Ikt−s − ILk−1
If bank k made investment in the period t = −1, it means that its liquidity must
be at least as high as its reserve requirement, that is, Lk−1 ≥ Rk−1. By substitut-
ing the exogenously chosen values for equity, deposit, interbank borrowing and
lending into the above expression gives
Lk−1 = E
k
−1 +D
k
−1 + IB
k
−1 −
τ∑
s=1
Ikt−s − ILk−1
Rk−1 ≤ Ek−1 +Dk−1 + IBk−1 −
τ∑
s=1
Ikt−s − ILk−1
βD¯k ≤ χSk + D¯k −
τ∑
s=1
Ikt−s
τ∑
s=1
Ikt−s ≤ χSk + D¯k − βD¯k
τ∑
s=1
Ikt−s ≤ χSk + (1− β)D¯k
By assuming that the total investment made is spread evenly across the last τ
periods gives
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τIkt−s ≤ χSk + (1− β)D¯k
Ikt−s ≤
χSk + (1− β)D¯k
τ
for all value of s.
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5.3 Analysis and discussion
Unless otherwise stated, the values of all the parameters used in the simulation
are given in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: The values of all the parameters used in the simulation (unless otherwise stated)
Parameter Representation Value
N Number of simulations 10000
T Number of periods 1000
M Number of banks 6
τ Maturity period of an investment 3
rD Interest rate for deposit 0
rI Investment income 0.01
rB Interest rate for interbank lending 0.005
χ Equity requirement ratio 0.05
β Reserve requirement ratio 0.1
φ Capital adequacy requirement ratio 0.08
S¯ Size of large bank 5000
σD Fluctuation in deposit 0.1
αL Parameter in the deposit fluctuation process for large bank 0.95
αS Parameter in the deposit fluctuation process for small bank 0.8
δ Aggregate deposit and investment opportunity ratio 0.5
κ Imbalance between deposit and investment opportunity 1
ρI Weighted risk for investment 0.2
ρIL Weighted risk for interbank lending 0.5
5.3.1 Network structure
Based on the description of the construction of the banking system in Section
5.2.1, in order to generate one realisation of the network structure, the two pa-
rameters needed are the number of banks in the system, M , and the imbalance
parameter between bank’s deposit and investment opportunity, κ. From Equation
(5.1), the current network structure of the banking system can be interpreted as
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two segments: the large bank in the centre and the small bank(s) on the periph-
ery. Each of these segments has the size of S¯. It has been assumed for simplicity
that there is only one large bank in the system. Therefore, the number of small
banks, that is M − 1, determines the size of each small banks. Equation (5.2) is
then used to work out the imbalance between deposit and investment opportu-
nity for each bank. This imbalance for each bank is in turn used to calculate the
average deposit size and average investment opportunity size in Equation (5.3)
and (5.4) respectively. Therefore, I first present the results regarding the network
structure and how these two parameters play a role in the model.
The number of small banks in the system
Figure 5.1 shows the probability of banks surviving until the end of the 1000
periods with different number of ‘small’ banks in the system. The fluctuation in
deposit for banks is given in Equation (5.5). With αS chosen to be 0.8, small
banks are modelled in the way that they do not suffer from liquidity shortage aris-
ing from the daily change in customers’ deposit. Therefore, assuming that they
are not connected to the ‘large’ bank, they do not default themselves. Hence,
what Figure 5.1 shows is that the default of small banks arises as a result of
transacting with the large one through the interbank market. It shows that when
there are only two parties in the system, the chances of survival for both banks are
the lowest. This is because the extension of interbank loans is not available and
there are no other parties that the ‘large’ bank can borrow from. When the large
bank fails to repay the loans to its creditor, the creditor bank suffers from a loss
in equity and if this loss is big enough, the creditor bank defaults due to negative
equity. This is supported by Figure 5.3, which shows the average number periods
the large bank successfully arranges an interbank transaction before it defaults
or until the end of the 1000 periods. It can be seen that, in the absence of loan
extension or other interbank lenders, the large bank can only arrange 4 interbank
transactions with the ‘small’ bank per simulation. As the number of ‘small’ banks
increases in the system, the large one starts to have enough interbank creditors
to transact with and this is reflected in Figure 5.1 in which the probability of
the survival of large bank increases. The decrease in large bank default in turn
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reduces the probability of small banks default arising from non-repayment of in-
terbank loans.
Figure 5.1: Probability of banks surviving until the end of the 1000 periods with different
number of small banks in the system
Figure 5.4 illustrates some of the features from the balance sheet of a de-
faulted bank. The solid line shows the average amount of negative liquidity of a
bank when it defaults. There is an increase in the magnitude of negative liquidity
of a defaulted bank when the number of small banks increases. This is because
in the presence of more counterparties in the system, the large bank has more
potential interbank creditors to borrow from. As a result, the large bank has
a higher chance of surviving its liquidity shortage and hence those who default
must have a high liquidity need. The fact that the dotted line is always much
higher than the dash line indicates that, at all time, the immature investment is
always higher than the customers’ deposit. This means that, the bank should be
able to pay back to its customers’, even by selling off the immature investment
at a discounted value.
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Figure 5.2: Number of incidents of default arising from liquidity or equity issue with different
number of small banks in the system
Figure 5.3: Average number of periods that the large bank successfully arranges interbank
borrowings in the presence of different number of small banks in the system
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Figure 5.4: Size of customers’ deposit, liquidity and immature investment when banks default,
with different number of small banks in the system
Figure 5.5 illustrates the percentage of investment opportunity achieved by
banks. Due to the way the imbalance is modelled for large and small banks,
it is expected that the small banks would be able to achieve close to 100% of
its available investment opportunity while the large bank is only able to achieve
around 40%, as indicated in Figure 5.5. It also shows that increasing the number
of small banks in the system do not affect the level of investment opportunity
fulfilled by small banks. Introducing more small banks in the system is equiva-
lent to dividing the aggregate average deposit and investment opportunity in the
small-bank segment equally among these small banks.
Therefore, based on the current setting, it is favourable to split the ‘small-
bank’ sector into more small banks. This is because it increases the potential
number of counterparties that the large bank can transact with. This results
in an increase in the interbank activity and reduces the chances of large bank
default. Since Figure 5.5 shows that the average percentage of investment oppor-
tunity fulfilled remains unchanged for both large and small banks regardless of
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Figure 5.5: Percentage of investment opportunity fulfilled by banks with different number of
small banks in the system
the number of small banks in the system, therefore a reduction in the default in
banks also result in an overall increase in the aggregate investment opportunity
fulfilled in the system.
The imbalance between deposit and investment opportunity
Next, I study the effect of this imbalance parameter on the banking system. Fig-
ure 5.6 compares the probability of bank surviving until the end of the 1000
periods, with different values for the imbalance between deposit and investment
opportunity. It shows that as the value of κ increases, the probability of large
bank surviving until the end of 1000 periods increases. The explanation is as
follows. By definition, the imbalance parameter is used to determine the differ-
ence between size of deposit and size of investment opportunity for banks, and by
assumption, only the small banks can be potential interbank lenders. Therefore,
the value of κ directly affects the amount of surplus liquidity small banks have
upon making investment and this in turn affects the availability of liquidity as
potential interbank loans. At low value of κ, the size of imbalance is small and
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as a result, the amount of surplus liquidity small banks have is little. This means
that the interbank activity is low. This is supported by Figure 5.8 that, the av-
erage number of interbank transactions the large bank can request is low, at low
values of κ. As the value of κ increases, the interbank activity increases. This
increase in interbank activity indicates that when the large bank has liquidity
shortage, it is able to request interbank loans from the small banks. Hence, it
results in the improved probability of survival for large bank in Figure 5.6.
While the relationship between the probability of survival against κ is mono-
tonically increasing for large bank, the relationship between probably of survival
against κ for small banks is a U-shaped curve. It can be seen that there is a
slight drop in the probability of survival for small banks between κ = 0.6 to 0.8.
The explanation is as follow. As mentioned before, the fluctuation in deposit for
small banks is modelled to be small, therefore, the small banks alone do not suffer
from liquidity shortage and hence they do not default. This means that when
the small banks do not have surplus liquidity to lend out as interbank loans, that
is, when the value of κ is extremely small, their probability of survival should
be 1. As the value of κ gradually increases, the small banks start to lend out
interbank loans to the large bank. As shown earlier, this does help the large bank
in dealing with their liquidity issue and as a result, improves their chances of
survival. However, in some occasions, when the large bank is unable to repay its
interbank loans to its creditor, that is those small banks, then they suffer from a
loss in equity and if this loss is large enough, the small banks will default. This
is shown in Figure 5.7. The line which represents banks that result in liquidity
default comes from the liquidity shortage of large bank and it decreases as the
value of κ increases. This relates to how the interbank loans from small banks to
the large one helps reducing the default of large bank. The other line which rep-
resents banks that default as a result of equity loss. The increases in the number
of incidents of equity default between κ = 0.6 to 0.8 explains why there is a fall
in the probability of survival for small banks in Figure 5.6.
However, Figure 5.6 shows that eventually the probability of survival for small
banks increases and at large value of κ, the probability of survival for both types
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Figure 5.6: Probability of banks surviving until the end of the 1000 periods with different
value of κ
Figure 5.7: Number of incidents of default arising from liquidity or equity issue with different
value of κ
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of banks is 1. This is because there are always small banks with surplus liquidity
to lend out as interbank loans to the large bank when it suffers from liquidity
shortage. The problem for a system with κ between 0.6 and 1 is that some of the
otherwise healthy small banks default as a result of transacting in the interbank
market. The trade off of using the interbank market is that on one hand, it causes
small banks to suffer from equity default. On the other hand, it increases the
probability of survival for large bank by nearly 50%.
Figure 5.8: Average number of periods that the large bank successfully arranges interbank
borrowings with different value of κ
Although Figure 5.6 shows that the imbalance modelled has a positive effect
on the stability on the banking system, it has its drawbacks. Figure 5.9 shows
the average aggregate volume of investment made by all banks at different values
of κ. It is of no surprise to see that the larger the imbalance, the less aggre-
gate investment the banks are able to make. This is because a larger value of
κ means that the big bank has more investment opportunity and less deposits.
This results in more unfulfilled investment opportunity due to lack of available
liquidity net reserve. On the other hand, a larger value of κ means that the small
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banks have more deposits and less investment opportunity. Therefore, there will
be more surplus liquidity used while the total amount of investment fulfilled by
small banks is reduced.
Figure 5.9: Average aggregate volume of investment made with different value of κ
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5.3.2 Regulatory requirement
After considering the effect of the two parameters that determine the specific net-
work structure of the banking system, I then investigate how do the regulatory
requirements play a role in the model.
Reserve requirement
Figure 5.10 displays the probability of survival banks until the end of the 1000
periods with respect to different values of the reserve requirement ratio, that is
β. The purpose of the reserve requirement is to ensure that banks hold a cer-
tain proportion of its customers’ deposit as liquid cash. Therefore, the reserve
provides insurance to banks against any unforeseen liquidity need. On the other
hand, on the profitability perspective, holding reserve does not do the bank any
good. Therefore, one would expect the tightening of reserve requirement, that is
to increase the value of β, would bring an increase in the probability of survival
for banks and in return, there would be a decrease in terms of investment op-
portunity fulfilled. Figure 5.13 shows the latter phenomenon that, as the value
of β increases, it results in a fall in the aggregate volume of investment made.
However, regarding the relationship between β and the probability of bank sur-
vival, as shown in Figure 5.10, is ambiguous. This ambiguity arises because the
level of reserve a bank holds affects the likelihood and amount it can potentially
lend out as interbank loans. Therefore, in the presence of an interbank market,
the change in the value of β influences the stability of the system in two ways.
Figure 5.10 shows that as the value of β increases, the probability of survival
for the small banks increases. As mentioned previously, if small banks are not
involved in any interbank transactions, the fluctuation in deposit they face is
never large enough to cause any default. The reduction in interbank activity
is evidenced in Figure 5.11, which shows that the average number of interbank
borrowings the large bank arranges decreases as β decreases. This is accompa-
nied by a fall in the number of incidents of equity default, as shown in Figure 5.12.
For the large bank, at low values of β, an increase of β between 0.1 to 0.3
produces a positive effect on the probability of survival for large bank. The tight-
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Figure 5.10: Probability of banks surviving until the end of the 1000 periods with different
values of β
ening of the reserve requirement implies that all banks are holding more reserve.
However, those small banks, by assumption, are those with proportionately more
deposit than their investment opportunity. Therefore, although they are retain-
ing more deposit as reserve, they still have an abundant amount of liquid cash
to be lent out as interbank loans. Therefore, this keeps the interbank market
relatively active, together with the additional reserve the large bank is holding as
insurance against deposit fluctuation, the probability of survival for large banks
improves. Unfortunately, as the value of β continues to increases, that is between
0.3 to 0.8, the probability of survival falls rapidly. This is because the high value
of reserve requirement starts to inhibit the interbank activity significantly. In the
current setting, due to how the imbalance is modelled, a higher proportion of the
aggregate customers’ deposit is allocated to the small-bank segment. Therefore,
when the value of β is increased by 0.1, the aggregate amount of addition reserve
small banks hold is much greater than what the large bank holds. The change
in the value of β does not affect the fluctuation in customers’ deposit. In other
words, the frequency and magnitude of liquidity shortage the large bank faces
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remain unchanged. Hence, part of liquid cash that was previously available to
the large bank as interbank loans now becomes small banks’ reserves. As a result,
the large bank, without the aid from the interbank market, now having to rely
on its own reserve against its liquidity shortage would default. Therefore, in the
middle range of β, increasing the value has a stronger effect on hindering the
interbank activity than on providing extra insurance for large bank.
Figure 5.11: Average number of periods that the large bank successfully arranges interbank
borrowings with different values of β
However, at high value of β, that is from 0.8 onwards, increasing the value
of β improves the probability of survival of large bank significantly. As shown in
Figure 5.11, there are no interbank activities for β higher than 0.8. This implies
that that the large bank relies solely on its reserve against the fluctuation in cus-
tomers’ deposit. And when β = 1, the probability of survival is 1.
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Figure 5.12: Number of incidents of default arising from liquidity or equity issue with different
value of β
Figure 5.13: Average aggregate volume of investment made with different value of β
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Capital adequacy requirement
Figure 5.14 shows the probability of survival of banks till the end of the 1000
periods with respect to different values of the capital adequacy requirement ra-
tio, that is φ. Similar to the reserve requirement ratio, β, the capital adequacy
requirement ratio, φ, affects the interbank activity directly, and hence it influ-
ences the probability of bank survivals. Figure 5.14 shows that, at low value of
φ, increasing the value of φ do not have any effects on the probability of survival
on both types of banks. This is because when the ratio is low, the amount of
capital that a bank holds is sufficient to satisfy the capital adequacy requirement
against its risk-weighted assets. In other words, when a potential interbank lender
considers transacting in the interbank market, as given in Equation (5.21), the
determination of the final amount to be transacted is likely to be based on the
liquidity need of the borrower bank and the surplus liquidity of the lender bank.
Therefore, at low values of φ, the interbank market functions efficiently. When φ
is between 0.15 and 0.25, there is a fall in probability of survival for both types of
banks. This is because the interbank market is still at work, but with restrictions.
As shown in Figure 5.15, there is a gradual decrease in the number of interbank
borrowings from large bank for 0.15 ≤ φ ≤ 0.25. This means that φ starts to
play a role in the Equation (5.21), by either reducing the amount of interbank
loan the lender bank otherwise would have lent, or preventing the lender bank
to lend out any interbank loan. This exposes those banks that actually transact
with the large bank to more risk.
However, as shown in Figure 5.15, the interbank activity falls considerably as
φ exceeds 0.25. This indicates that the capital adequacy requirement ratio starts
to become the main determinant in the arrangement of interbank loans and when
the ratio is high enough, it completely shuts down all interbank activities. On
one hand, this prevents the small banks from equity default arising from the non-
repayment of interbank loans from the large bank. However, on the other hand,
restricting interbank activity results in large bank defaulting immediately from
its liquidity shortage.
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Figure 5.14: Probability of banks surviving until the end of the 1000 periods with different
values of φ
Figure 5.15: Average number of periods that the large bank successfully arranges interbank
borrowings with different values of φ
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5.4 Parameter sensitivity
In constructing the model, numerous assumptions were used together with
many parameters in building the network of banking system, in the daily opera-
tions of banks and in the interaction between banks through interbank market.
This section demonstrates the robustness of the results with respect to changes in
the values of these parameters. The values of all parameters for the benchmark
model are given in Table 5.2. Among these parameters, the reserve requirement
ratio has been chosen to be 10%, according to the Boards of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System1 and the capital adequacy requirement ratio has been
chosen to be 8% based on the Basel II2. The values for the risk weights of cash,
investment and interbank lending have been chosen in accordance to U.S. Basel.
III3 Cash has 0% risk weighting, investment has 20% risk weighting and interbank
lending has 50% risk weighting. Apart from these, the values of the remaining
parameters are changed over a range and the results are reported below.
In order to analyse the parameter sensitivity, each of the parameters is tested
separately. For each parameter, its value used in the benchmark model is taken to
extend to a wide range of values. Then 100 different values are chosen from this
range and for each value chosen, 1000 simulations are run to test the robustness
of the parameter. δ denotes the aggregate deposit and investment opportunity
ratio in the banking system. Varying the value of δ affects the liquid resource
a bank holds upon making investment. This effect is two-fold. Firstly, a bank
with excess liquid resource is better-protected for itself against the fluctuation in
customers’ deposit. Secondly, the liquid resource also affects its availability of
liquidity for lending out to others through the interbank market. Therefore, it is
expected that a smaller value of δ would reduce the probability and severity of a
bank suffering from liquidity shortage arising from customers’ deposit and would
also increase the availability of liquidity for interbank transactions if needed. The
value of δ in the benchmark model is 0.5. Figure 5.1 shows that, in the presence
of 6 banks in the system, the probabilities of banks surviving until the end of the
1http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/reservereq.htm
2http://www.newyorkfed.org/education/pdf/2012/Yang bank capital regulation.pdf
3http://www.usbasel3.com/docs/Final%20LCR%20Visual%20Memo.pdf
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1000 periods are 98.31% and 99.14% for large and small banks respectively. 100
different numbers have been drawn from 0.45 to 0.55 and each value has been
simulated 1000 times. Qualitatively similar results were found for this wide range
of values in comparison to the benchmark model. The average value of δ in the
100000 simulation is 0.4991 and the average probability of banks surviving are
98.32% and 99.22% for large and small banks respectively. This is illustrated in
Table 5.3. The finding also shows that the probabilities of survival are higher for
both types of banks at a smaller value of δ and this coincides with the expectation.
αL and αS play a role in determining the fluctuation in deposit for large and
small banks respectively. In the benchmark case, the value for αL and αS are
0.95 and 0.8 respectively. Both parameters were tested separately for robustness.
αL is tested against a range between 0.9 to 1 while αS is tested against the range
between 0.75 to 0.85. Again, results were found to be qualitatively the same, as
shown in Table refParameter sensitivity. A decrease in the value of αL reduces
the deposit fluctuation for large bank, which is the most vulnerable bank in facing
liquidity shortage. As a result, the probability of large bank surviving is higher
when the value of αL is low. On the other hand, a change in the value of αS
has a less significant effect on the bank system. This is because when αS = 0.8
in the benchmark model, it is low enough that small banks never experience a
big enough deposit fluctuation that causes liquidity shortage in them. Therefore,
varying the values of αS does not produce a big effect on the excess resources on
small banks and in turn, the availability of liquidity for interbank lending to the
large bank. Overall, both parameters are found to be robust.
Similarly, RI , RB and σD are all tested for robustness and the results are all
shown in Table refParameter sensitivity. All of them produce qualitatively and
quantitatively similar results over a wide range of values, also given in Table ref-
Parameter sensitivity.
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Table 5.3: Parameter sensitivity
Parameter Value Range Averaged Probability of surviving for
value large bank small banks
δ 0.5 0.45 - 0.55 0.4991 0.9832 0.9922
αL 0.95 0.90 - 1.00 0.9443 0.9928 0.9967
αS 0.8 0.75 - 0.85 0.8010 0.9839 0.9925
rI 0.01 0.005 - 0.015 0.010 0.9840 0.9925
rB 0.005 0.001 - 0.010 0.005 0.9846 0.9927
σD 0.1 0.095 - 0.105 0.100 0.9848 0.9928
5.5 An extended model
After considering the benchmark model in the presence of 6 banks in the sys-
tem, in which there are only 1 large bank in the core and 5 small banks at the
peripheral, it is of interest to consider a more general case with more core banks
in the system. For comparison purpose, it is assumed that for each large bank in
the banking system, there are 5 other small banks present and that these 5 small
banks are only connected to the same large core bank while all large banks are
connected to each other. Everything else has been assumed to be the same as
the benchmark model.
However, a major problem emerged when simulating this general case. Fig-
ure 5.16 shows that the probability of banks surviving until the end of the 1000
periods is the same in both the benchmark model and the extended model. First
of all, it has always been modelled that large banks have plenty of investment
opportunity. This means that they rarely have excess resource to lend out as
interbank loans. Besides, large banks are modelled to face a bigger fluctuation in
deposit such that the fluctuation is enough to cause liquidity shortage in them. In
turn, this creates the need to borrow interbank transactions from other potential
lenders, which happen to be the small banks. These two factors together imply
that although connections exist among the large banks, they never trade with
each other through the interbank market. This can be interpreted as a banking
system with many subset of systems, each of which has 6 banks in total and the
banks in each subset only trade with each other. Therefore, the focus will be
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shifted slightly to explore the effect of merging some of the small banks to form
a big bank.
Figure 5.16: Probability of banks surviving until the end of the 1000 periods in the benchmark
model and the extended model
Let’s consider a system of 30 banks with 5 large core banks and for each of
them, there are 5 small banks connected at the peripheral. Similar to what was
discussed above, this can be interpreted at 5 subsets of the benchmark model
and the probability of bank surviving until the end of the 1000 periods should
be the same as Figure 5.16. Each time, one of the small banks from each subset
will be merged together to form a large bank. Therefore, the merged bank has
the same bank size of the large bank, however, it has the properties of the small
banks, including the deposit fluctuation, the imbalance between deposit and in-
vestment opportunity. It is then assumed that the merged bank is now connected
to all other large core banks. Therefore, after merging 5 small banks into 1, a
modified banking structure is created. There are now 6 core large banks in the
system, 5 of which have the same properties of the large banks as before while the
remaining one functions as a small bank, despite its size. Therefore, when any
103
5.5 An extended model
of the 5 large banks face liquidity shortage, they can approach both their own
connected small banks or this merged bank for interbank transaction, depending
on availability. It should be noted that since one of the small banks from each
subset is combined to form the merged bank, therefore, each of the large bank
should now be connected to 4 other small banks only. In doing so, the aggregate
bank size, customer deposit and investment opportunity all remain unchanged.
Figure 5.17: Probability of banks surviving until the end of the 1000 periods in the presence
of merged banks
Figure 5.17 shows the probability of banks surviving until the end of the 1000
periods for large banks, small banks and merged banks. As mentioned before, in
the absence of merged banks, the banking system can be interpreted as 5 sub-
sets of the benchmark modelled connected together through the large core banks.
However, based on how the banking system is designed, large banks are unable
to transact with each other through the interbank market. Therefore, the proba-
bility of bank surviving is only as good as the benchmark model. But Figure 5.17
illustrates that by merging one small bank from each subset to a large core bank,
the probability of banks surviving until the end of 1000 periods increases for both
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large and small banks. This is because without merging some of the small banks
together, some of the available liquid resource in one subset is not accessible to
large core banks in another subset. This means that the merging of banks brings
a better distribution of resources among the system, and as a result, it brings an
increase in probability of survival for banks.
5.6 Conclusion
This chapter has presented an artificial interbank market model with a specific
network structure, the tiering structure. In order for the model to exhibit higher
resemblance to the real-world market, the imbalance parameter has been incor-
porated into the model. This imbalance parameter plays a role in determining
the heterogeneity in the size of customers’ deposit and investment opportunity in
banks. This is because it has been empirically shown that large banks are usu-
ally the deposit-taking banks while the small banks often have more investment
opportunity available to them. Besides, empirical studies also find that large
banks tend to be net borrowers in the interbank market while smalls banks act
as lenders. To accommodate this, the fluctuation in customers’ deposit has been
modelled to be large for large banks to create this higher liquidity need in large
banks.
One of the main focuses of the research has been on the role of the imbalance
parameter in the system. It has been shown that the stability of the banking
system is closely related to the interbank activity, which in term is related to
the availability of lenders and the amount of surplus liquidity they have. It has
been illustrated that when interbank lenders are rare, that is when κ is low, the
large bank is very vulnerable to the fluctuation of customers’ deposit. This small
imbalance between deposit and investment opportunity in the small banks result
in them not having excess liquidity to lend out as interbank loans. However,
by increasing this imbalance in banks, this makes those small banks to become
potential lenders in the interbank market. The significant increase in the prob-
ability of the survival of large banks is witnessed by the increase in interbank
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activity. And when the heterogeneity between deposit and investment opportu-
nity in banks become very high, the abundant availability of interbank lenders
results in a very stable system. The drawback of an increase in interbank activity
is that when the level of activity is mild, there are occasional default of those
otherwise healthy small banks as a result of non-repayment from the large bank.
Although a greater imbalance in banks does seem to improve the stability of the
system, the presence of this imbalance in deposit and investment opportunity
is not without its pitfall. This is because an increase in this imbalance param-
eter effectively reduces the aggregate investment opportunity to the ‘small’ banks.
The second focus of the research is on the role of regulatory requirements on
the stability of the system. Similar to varying the imbalance parameter, chang-
ing the regulatory requirements has a direct effect on the availability of potential
interbank lenders and the amount of funds they can provide, which in turn affect
the number of defaults in the system. It has been shown that the relationship
between tightening the reserve requirement and the stability of the system is non-
monotonic. This is because the tightening of reserve requirement in banks has
an insurance effect on individual banks but it also affects the interbank activity.
When a bank has a higher reserve requirement, it has to retain a bigger portion
of its customers’ deposit as liquid reserve. Therefore, on an individual level, each
bank is better protected against unforeseen liquidity shortages. However, holding
a higher amount of liquid reserve within a bank also implies that its available
surplus liquidity as potential interbank loans is reduced. On the aggregate level,
this affects the successfulness of banks arranging an interbank borrowings and
results iner a lower activity level of interbank trading. On the positive note, it
can be seen that there is a range of values of β in which banks are better insu-
lated against liquidity shortage, arising from the addition liquid reserve they are
holding, while the interbank activity is still relatively active. Unfortunately, this
range of values is highly dependent on the network structure and the character-
istic of the banking system.
While tightening reserve requirement makes banks better insulated against
liquidity shocks, an increase in capital adequacy requirement helps banks become
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better protected against equity default. When a bank lends out interbank loans,
it exposes itself to counterparty risk that the borrower bank is unable to repay the
loan when it is due. The capital adequacy requirement plays a role in controlling
the amount of risk it takes up in risky investment and interbank lending. In other
words, it regulates the chances of a bank defaulting as a result of a loss in equity.
It has been shown that when the capital adequacy requirement is tightened, a
liquidity surplus bank is unable to commit to as much interbank lending as it
otherwise would have. On one hand, this reduces the probability of default for
potential lender banks. However, it also reduces the interbank activity, which in
turn results in a higher default for banks with liquidity need.
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Conclusion
6.1 Summary
This research studies an artificial interbank market model with a tiering network
structure. It analyses some of its network structure characteristics and examines
the role of regulatory requirements on the system.
Chapter 1 describes the background and the motivation of the research. It
proposes a number of research questions and an overview of the thesis. Chapter
2 presents a literature review on the financial contagion in the interbank mar-
ket. This includes the channel of contagion in the interbank lending market, the
use of network topology in representing the structure of the market, the empir-
ical studies of the network structure and the interbank contagion in real-world
banking systems and the theoretical analysis of the systemic risk in some artifi-
cial models. Chapter 3 presents the implementation of Iori, Jafarey, and Padilla
(2006) model, which investigate the systemic risk in the interbank market with
a random network structure and in the presence of heterogeneity in the system.
The implementation forms the basic model of this research. However, there are a
number of problems encountered during the implementation, Therefore, Chapter
4 points out these problems and provides modifications to the model, together
with some preliminary results. Chapter 5 introduces the interbank market model
for this research, describing the construction of the network of an interbank mar-
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ket and the simulation procedure of the operation of banks. It then presents the
simulation results and also provides an analysis and a discussion of the results.
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Algorithm
A.1 Implementation of Iori, Jafarey, and Padilla
(2006) Model
In this section, I provide all the algorithms for implementing Iori, Jafarey,
and Padilla (2006) model in the presence of interbank transactions described in
Chapter 3.
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Algorithm 2 Connectivity matrix
1: Input variables: c,M
2: for i = 1 to M do
3: for j = 1 to M do
4: if i = j then
5: Jij = 0
6: else if i > j then
7: Generate a random number P such that P ∈ U[0, 1]
8: if P ≤ c then
9: Jij = 1
10: else
11: Jij = 0
12: end if
13: Jij = Jji . The matrix is symmetric along the main diagonal
14: end if
15: end for
16: end for
Algorithm 3 Initial size
1: Input variables: M, S¯, σS, σI , δ
2: for k = 1 to M do
3: Generate µ ∼ N(0, 1)
4: Sk = |S¯ + σSµ|
5: Generate ν ∼ N(0, 1)
6: Ok = δ × |Sk + σIν|
7: end for
Algorithm 4 Initial period
1: Input variables: k, χ, τ
2: Ak−1 = S
k
3: V k−1 = χA
k
−1
4: for i = 1 to τ do
5: Ik−i = 0.5×Ok
6: end for
7: Bk−1 = 0 . No interbank transaction at time t− 1
8: Lk−1 = A
k
−1 +B
k
−1 + V
k
−1 − Ik−1
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Algorithm 5 Deposit
1: Generate t ∼ N(0, 1)
2: Akt = |Sk + σA
√
Skt| or
3: Akt = |Sk + σASkt|
4: Lˆkt = L
k
t−1 + (A
k
t − Akt−1)− raAkt−1 + ρ
τ∑
s=1
Ikt−s + I
k
t−τ
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Algorithm 6 Repayment of interbank loans
1: Set 1 = 1
2: while 1 ≥ 1 do
3: Generate k ∈ ZM . Choose a bank randomly
4: if Bkt−1 > 0 and Lˆ
k
t ≥ (1 + rb)Bkt−1 then
5: lˆkt = Lˆ
k
t − (1 + rb)Bkt−1
6: Bkt−1 = 0
7: for j = 1 to M do
8: if j 6= k and Bkjt−1 > 0 then
9: lˆjt−1 = Lˆ
j
t−1 + (1 + rb)B
kj
t−1
10: Bkjt−1 = B
jk
t−1 = 0
11: end if
12: end for
13: end if
14: Set 1 = 0
15: for k = 0 to M do
16: if Bkt−1 > 0 and Lˆ
k
t ≥ (1 + rb)Bkt−1 then
17: 1 + = 1
18: end if
19: end for
20: end while
21: for k = 0 to M do
22: if Bkt−1 > 0 and Lˆ
k
t ≤ (1 + rb)Bkt−1 then
23: lˆkt = Lˆ
k
t − (1 + rb)Bkt−1
24: vˆkt = lˆ
k
t +
τ−1∑
s=1
Ikt−s − Akt
25: end if
26: end for
Algorithm 7 Excess and reserve
1: Ekt = vˆ
k
t /A
k
t
2: Rkt = βA
k
t
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Algorithm 8 Dividend payment
1: if Ekt > χ then
2: Dkt = max{0,min[ρ
τ∑
s=1
Ikt−s − raAkt−1 − rbBkt−1, Lˆkt − Rkt , Lˆkt +
τ−1∑
s=1
Ikt−s −
(1 + χ)Akt ]}
3: else
4: Dkt = 0
5: end if
6: L˜kt = lˆ
k
t −Dkt
Algorithm 9 Investment opportunity
1: Generate ηt ∼ N(0, 1)
2: ωkt = |Ok + σωOkηt
3: Ωkt = ω
k
t
Algorithm 10 Investment
1: Inv = min[max(0, L˜kt −Rkt ),Ωkt ]
2: Ikt + = Inv
3: Ωkt − = Inv
4: L˙kt = L˜
k
t − Inv
5: V˙ kt = L˙
k
t +
τ−1∑
s=0
Ikt−s − Akt −Bkt
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Algorithm 11 Default
1: Set Default = 0
2: for k = 1 to M do
3: if Lkt < 0 or V
k
t < 0 then
4: for j = 1 to M do
5: Jjk = Jkj = 0
6: end for
7: Default + = 1
8: end if
9: end for
10: Total − defaultt = Default
11: Cumu− defaultt + = Default
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Algorithm 12 Interbank lending for liquidity
1: Set 1 = 1
2: while 1 ≥ 1 do
3: while 1 ≥ 1 do
4: Generate k ∈ ZM . Choose a bank randomly
5: if Lkt < 0 and V
k
t ≥ then
6: Exchange = 0
7: while 1 ≥ 1 do
8: Generate i ∈ ZM . Choose a bank randomly
9: if k 6= i then
10: if Jki = 1 and (L
k
t + b
ik
t −Rit) > 0 and Bkit−1 ≤ 0 and V it ≥ 0
and Ωit ≤ 0 then
11: bkit = min[|Lkt | − Exchange, Lit −Bkit −Rit]
12: bikt = b
ki
t
13: Exchange + = bkit
14: end if
15: end if
16: Set 1 = 0
17: if Exchange < |Lkt | then
18: for j = 1 to M do
19: if k 6= j then
20: if Jkj = 1 and (L
k
t + b
jk
t −Rjt ) > 0 and Bkjt−1 ≤ 0 and
V jt ≥ 0 and Ωjt then
21: 1 + = 1
22: end if
23: end if
24: end for
25: end if
26: end while
27: To be continued ...
116
A.1 Implementation of Iori, Jafarey, and Padilla (2006) Model
Algorithm 13 Interbank lending for liquidity - continued
28: if Exchange = |Lkt | then
29: Lkt = 0
30: Bkt−1 = 0
31: for j = 1 to M do
32: if k 6= j then
33: if bkjt > 0 then
34: Bkjt = b
kj
t
35: Bjkt = b
jk
t
36: Bkt + = b
kj
t
37: Ljt + = b
jk
t
38: Bkt + = b
jk
t
39: end if
40: if bkjt−1 > 0 then
41: Lkt + = (1 + rb)B
kj
t−1
42: Call ‘Excess, dividend and investment’
43: Bkjt−1 = B
kj
t−1 = 0
44: end if
45: end if
46: end for
47: else if Exchange < |Lkt | then
48: for j = 1 to M do
49: if j 6= k then
50: bkjt = b
kj
t = 0
51: end if
52: end for
53: end if
54: To be continued ...
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Algorithm 14 Interbank lending for liquidity - continued
55: Set 1 = 0
56: for k = 1 to M do
57: Set Resources = 0
58: if Lkt < 0 and V
k
t ≥ 0 then
59: for j = 1 to M do
60: if j 6= k then
61: if Jkj = 1 and (L
k
t − Rjt ) > 0 and Bkjt−1 ≤ 0 and
V jt ≥ 0 and Ωjt ≤ 0 then
62: Resources + = (Ljt −Rjt )
63: end if
64: end if
65: end for
66: if Resources ≥ |Lkt | then
67: 1 + = 1
68: end if
69: end if
70: end for
71: end if
72: end while
73: end while
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Algorithm 15 Banking system
1: Input variables: N, T
2: for n = 1 to N do
3: Call ’Connectivity matrix’
4: Call ’Initial size’
5: for t = 0 to T do
6: for k = 1 to M do
7: if t = 0 then
8: Call ’Initial period’
9: end if
10: if Lkt−1 ≥ 0 and V kt−1 ≥ 0 then
11: Call ’Deposit’
12: Call ‘Investment opportunity’
13: end if
14: end for
15: Call ’Repayment of interbank loans’
16: for k = 1 to M do
17: if Lkt−1 ≥ 0 and V kt−1 ≥ 0 then
18: Call ’Excess and reserve’
19: Call ‘Dividend payment’
20: Call ‘Investment’
21: end if
22: end for
23: if c = 0 then
24: Call ‘’Default’
25: else if c 6= 0 then
26: Call ‘Interbank lending for liquidity’
27: Call ‘Default’
28: end if
29: end for
30: end for
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